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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I probe the question of whether Muslims and Christians worship the same 
God primarily through the discipline of philosophy of language. Though a multifaceted 
question at its core (e.g., theological, historical), the question directly ties into how 
language operates in relation to God. That is, the ways in which Muslims and Christians 
make predications of God have a significant role in delineating whether they worship the 
same God. By working from the perspective of predication, I argue that Muslims and 
Christians refer to but do not worship the same God. In this sense, Muslims and 
Christians refer to the same God with the use of generic predicates (e.g., God is good); 
however, they do not worship same God given that worship entails the use of specific 
predicates (e.g., God is Triune). Muslims and Christians thus meet the criteria for 
common reference but cannot be regarded as maintaining the same referent in their 
worship. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCION 
Research Question 
Do Muslims and Christians worship the same God? One way to pursue this 
question is through the discipline of philosophy.1 For example, philosophy of language 
clarifies what is entailed in predication and, as a result, may contribute to its theological 
application in worship. Because worship entails linguistic elements (e.g., an informative 
function) that necessitate theological predication, it is important to understand how 
predicates function as they relate to the question at hand. In this respect, predication plays 
a fundamental role when deciding whether Muslims and Christians worship the same 
God. 
Toward an Account of Reference and Predication 
In An Interpretation of Religion, John Hick reflects on the plurality of religious 
experience2 and its reliability to orient people toward contemplation of God.3 He argues 
that various religious experiences arise because God is universally presupposed and thus 
 
1. It should be noted this question cannot be reduced to areas of philosophical inquiry alone, 
which includes several subdisciplines (e.g., philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, epistemology). 
Instead, embedded in the question are also theological, historical, and linguistic aspects that necessarily 
facilitate any decision of whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. That is, these areas of 
research would need to be addressed to offer systematic account of the issue at hand. 
2. See John Hick, God Has Many Names (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980). 
3. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Divine (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2005). See also John Hick, “Religious Pluralism and Salvation” in The Philosophical 
Challenge of Religious Diversity, ed. Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 54–66. 
 
 
 
2 
God receives different predicates (e.g., Shiva, Trinity, Allah) depending on the religious 
tradition. Hick’s hypothesis maintains that (1) God’s essence is unknowable and (2) 
humans are only capable of basic predications of God grounded in their religious 
experiences in the phenomenal world. In this respect, God is presupposed to exist through 
religious experiences and only varies in predication insofar as these experiences are 
influenced by one’s religious tradition that is contrived in a particular environment and 
culture (e.g., beliefs, liturgical rites). In other words, theological predicates are 
grammatical, rather than referential, concepts that are determined by religious experience; 
such experiences are exclusively phenomenological.4 This creates an ontological gulf 
between God and humanity that makes theological predicates, whether from a cataphatic 
or apophatic perspective, irrelevant for assessing the normative value of religious 
experience. The result of this dissimilarity between God and humanity makes any 
decision on the question at hand unwarranted, given that theological predicates are 
grounded in phenomenology. 
In his essay, “Christians, Muslims, and the Name of God,” Denys Turner 
questions the ontological gulf created in Hick’s hypothesis based on apophatic theology. 
If theological predicates are irrelevant even from an apophatic perspective, Turner argues 
this creates “an equivocal dividedness” in which God becomes utterly imperceptible. In 
situations where God is utterly imperceptible, there is no basis from which to conclude 
 
4. Hick is clear on this point. Religious experiences are analogous across major religious lines. 
They differ, however, only because the phenomenology of these experiences are adapted based on religious 
tradition. To clarify this point, take the following example: Two people looking at the same abstract 
painting have the same experience perceiving the painting. However, the painting will be interpreted 
differently by the two individuals based on the environmental and cultural factors influencing their 
phenomenal experience.  
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whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God.5 That is, if humans are unable to 
approach God via negativa, then there is no positive content to base a normative analysis 
on the question at hand. 
Turner tries to resolve this problem by deeming predicates useful insofar as they 
illuminate that God lacks spatial, temporal, and metaphysical parts (i.e., divine 
simplicity). In this way, predicates contain positive content insofar as they illustrate that 
God is beyond spatial, temporal, and metaphysical composition, which separates God 
from finite concepts. For example, Turner maintains that the Islamic predicate of Tawhid 
(i.e., oneness or unification) and the Christian predicate of God as Triune are useful 
because they illuminate that there is “no plurality of gods and no plurality in God.”6 
Therefore Turner’s line of argumentation is that the predicates of Tawhid and the Trinity 
have positive content because they illuminate that God is beyond human categorization. 
Turner thus concludes that Tawhid and the Trinity are not divergent theological 
claims since they highlight God’s simplicity that transcends the complexities of created 
composition. Given that Islam and Christianity maintain God’s utter transcendence, 
embedded in the predicates of Tawhid and the Trinity are analogous theological 
perspectives and therefore do not contradict each other from a numerical standpoint (i.e., 
God as exclusively one or God as Triune). In this way, Turner justifies that Muslims and 
 
5. This and other critiques of Hick’s hypothesis can be found in Sumner B. Twiss, “The 
Philosophy of Religious Pluralism: A Critical Appraisal of Hick and His Critics,” in The Philosophical 
Challenge of Religious Diversity, ed. Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 67–98. 
6. Denys Turner, “Christians, Muslims, and the Name of God: Who Owns It, and How Would We 
Know?” in Do we Worship the Same God? ed. by Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 35. 
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Christians worship the same God because they rely on an apophatic qualifier.7 Thus the 
essence of Turner’s argument is that if Muslims and Christians maintain that God is not 
made of spatial, temporal, or metaphysical parts, then they must worship the same God.  
In this sense, Turner tries to dial back the ontological gulf created in Hick’s 
hypothesis between God and humanity by relying on apophatic theology. However, an 
appeal to apophatic theology seems to forfeit the normative value of his argument since 
predication via negativa is metaphysically thin. That is, it is not particularly clear what 
Muslims and Christians agree on if there is little correspondence between God and 
humanity from which to assess the question at hand.8 
Miroslav Volf takes up a more cataphatic approach in Allah: A Christian 
Response. Volf introduces what he terms sufficient similarity with regards to whether 
Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Moving away from an apophatic extreme, 
sufficient similarity compares predicates of God and determines whether these “thoughts 
and utterances” refer to the same God. For Volf, to the extent that Muslims and 
Christians maintain that God is one, creator, good, love, and entirely different from 
creation, “it follows that” both traditions necessarily refer to the same God irrespective of 
doctrines such as Tawhid and the Trinity.9 Though the idea of sufficient similarity is 
 
7. It should be noted that Turner thinks the apophatic qualifier demonstrates only a necessary 
(though not sufficient) condition that Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Because he argues 
from an apophatic perspective, his argument can never be conclusive on whether Muslims and Christians 
worship the same God. 
8. For a similar argument, see Reza Shah-Kazemi, “Do Muslims and Christians Believe in the 
Same God?” in Do we Worship the Same God? ed. Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 76–
147. 
9. Miroslav Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 110, 145. 
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never robustly developed in Allah, Volf argues that Islamic and Christian predicates 
satisfy such sufficiency.  
He argues that Muslims and Christians not only refer to but subsequently worship 
the same God. Given that Muslims and Christians predicate similar (and at times 
identical) characteristics of God, their ability to refer to the same God entails that they 
worship the same God. Referring and worshiping are almost, if not entirely, synonymous 
terms.10 As he says, “When Christians and Muslims agree on the [five predications 
above], then in their worship of God they refer to the same object” (original emphasis).11 
In this way, Muslims and Christians worship the same God provided that their predicates 
of God are sufficiently similar. The argument here is similar to Turner’s, though from a 
cataphatic perspective, in that theological predicates are the basis for assessing that 
Muslims and Christians worship the same God. 
In his book Is the Father of Jesus the God of Muhammad?, Timothy George takes 
up Hick’s account and anticipates the latter two accounts.12 With respect to the question, 
George argues both “yes and no.” On the one hand, George affirms that Muslims and 
Christians share a set of fundamental predicates such as “oneness, eternity, power” and so 
 
10. It should be noted that Volf is not clear on the relationship between reference and worship. In 
fact, one cannot deduce whether predicates alone are enough for concluding that Muslims and Christians 
worship the same God. Though he seemingly makes that point in chapter 5, to be fair to Volf, he spends an 
entire chapter linking common practice (i.e., love of God and neighbor) as a sign that Muslims and 
Christians worship the same God. Therefore, it seems Volf is making two general arguments for why 
Muslims and Christians worship the same God: they share (1) a set of predicates of God and (2) common 
practices. That said, it seems to me that Volf thinks common predicates of God alone are enough for 
concluding that Muslims and Christians worship the same God, based on what is said in chapter 5. For 
specifics on this point, see Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 95–124. 
11. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 110. 
12. Timothy George, Is the Father of Jesus the God of Muhammad? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
2002). It should be noted that Timothy George wrote this book in 2002 prior to both Denys Turner’s essay 
(2012) and Miroslav Volf’s book (2011). Though his book is a critique of neither Turner nor Volf, he poses 
some serious problems for both of their projects. 
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forth. These and other predicates are affirmed by both traditions and represent a common 
entity in their speech acts. On the other hand, George argues that Trinity is an irreducible 
predicate that unavoidably conflicts with the predicate of Tawhid. Because it is 
irreducible in the life of God, Christianity “stands or falls” with the Trinity. Exclude the 
Trinity and Christianity’s fundamental doctrine—the Incarnation—is compromised. In 
this light, he argues that Tawhid and the Trinity are numerically and theologically 
divergent and cannot be easily resolved by an apophatic qualifier. Given the irreducible 
nature of Tawhid and the Trinity, George couples his earlier “yes” with an emphatic “no.” 
Thus he concludes that the Father of Jesus is not the God of Muhammad because the 
Trinity is irreducible in the life of God.13 
George makes a distinction between predicates shared by two (or more) religious 
traditions and predicates irreducible of a given religious tradition.14 For example, he 
clearly agrees with Turner and others that Muslims and Christians refer to the same God 
provided that they affirm a set of predicates. However, these predicates do not undermine 
or diminish predicates such as Tawhid and the Trinity. Thus his argument is that 
affirmation of a common entity of reference does not always have to invalidate predicates 
that are particular among a community. Instead one can affirm predicates that are 
 
13. For a similar argument, see Kenneth Cragg, Muhammad and the Christian (Oxford: Oneworld, 
1984). 
14. Though it is unclear exactly what George means by irreducible, I take him to mean that 
Christianity is upheld almost exclusively on divine revelation in the Incarnation. If the Trinity is removed, 
then the fundamental basis of Christianity is omitted. According to this construal, the Trinity is not an 
irreducible attribute in the life of God. That would be irrational and unjustifiable. Instead the Trinity (and 
subsequently Tawhid) are irreducible conceptions of God that demonstrate the particularities of each 
tradition. 
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common across religious lines and still maintain theological positions that are irreducible 
in one’s own tradition. 
More in agreement with George than the others, my claim is that Muslims and 
Christians do not worship the same God. I plan to establish that Muslims and Christians 
refer to the same God with the use of a proper name; however, the referential use of a 
proper name does not entail that Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Taking 
into consideration recent work in philosophy of language and the previous expositions, 
we must make two major distinctions with respect to the question: (a1) The ability for two 
(or more) people to refer to the same entity is not contingent upon an agreement over a 
detailed and exhaustive list of predicates. Rather, an entity can be cooperatively 
referenced by the use of a proper name provided that (i) both parties have a common 
causal-historical account (name-calling practice) and (ii) they share a set of predicates.15 
(a2) In light of (i) and clarification on (ii), both groups are able to refer to a given entity 
with the use of a proper name provided that the name connotes a similar set of generic 
predicates for both groups.16 That is, a proper name does not need to elucidate specific 
predicates to establish the referent. Given (a1) and (a2), I distinguish between reference by 
generic predication and worship by specific predication. 
(b) Provided that worship is multifaceted (e.g., words, movements, symbols), 
liturgy is the most robust expression of worship, given that it interweaves several 
elements into a collective whole. In this sense, liturgical rites constitute thick forms of 
 
15. See Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions” in Philosophy of Language, ed. 
A. P. Martinich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 265–77; Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980); Gareth Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names” in The Philosophy of 
Language, ed. A. P. Martinich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 314–25. 
16. John R. Searle, “Proper Names,” Mind 67.267 (1958): 166–73. 
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worship insofar as they incorporate concrete and particular words, movements, and 
symbols. Therefore, I restrict my project exclusively to liturgical rites and do not wade 
into minute (or thin) forms of worship. 
Note that distinctions (a) and (b) converge and diverge with the previous 
expositions. For instance, my response runs contrary to Hick’s hypothesis provided that 
my project maintains that reference and predication correspond (whether directly or 
indirectly) to an ontological reality (i.e., God). Furthermore, my argument goes contrary 
to Turner’s and Volf’s because they conflate philosophical terms such as predication, 
reference, and worship. Though their expositions are more balanced than Hick’s, there 
remains room for improvement with regard to what is entailed in predication, reference, 
and worship. And lastly, my response converges with George’s exposition, given that he 
makes an intuitive distinction between two types of predication. Though his argument is 
not primarily a philosophical analysis, his intuition to distinguish between predicates that 
are irreducible and ones that are not is the closest exposition to my own.  
Methodology 
My thesis employs insights from analytic philosophy and systematic theology. In 
relation to analytic philosophy, I draw from recent work in philosophy of language (i.e., 
Saul Kripke, John Searle, Keith Donnellan, Gareth Evans, and E. J. Lowe). In particular, 
I seek to establish the functions of reference and predication as they relate to a divine 
reality. Once these are established, I evaluate whether Muslims and Christians worship 
the same God, considering that reference and predication are embedded in the question. 
As for systematic theology, my thesis focuses on the loci of ecclesiology, Christology, 
and most importantly theology proper. I use systematic theology in these particular areas 
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to inform my perspective on how Muslims and Christians speak of God. In the end, my 
thesis is primarily regulated by philosophy interspersed with theological elements. In a 
technical sense, my methodology tracks as philosophical theology. 
Structure of the Thesis 
 In this chapter I have clarified the question that guides the structure and scope of 
this thesis. I have also included a brief account of the scholarly discussion of the 
question. In the second chapter I will make a basic distinction between reference and 
predication and clarify their particular functions. Accordingly, the chapter will also make 
a distinction between generic and specific predication. By building on these distinctions, 
the third chapter will develop an account of reference as it relates to the question. This 
account will primarily show that Muslims and Christians refer to but do not worship the 
same God. In the concluding chapter, I will sum up my overall argument while 
mentioning how this project does not necessitate intolerance and violence.  
Contributions to Scholarship 
 My aim for this thesis is modest since philosophy is but one of several relevant 
areas of research (e.g., theology, history) that contributes to whether Muslims and 
Christians worship the same God. Even so, this thesis makes two important contributions. 
The first contribution is that my thesis cleans up some technical language associated with 
the question. It has become apparent in the research that there is misunderstanding on 
what exactly is entailed in reference and predication as they relate to God. To mitigate 
such misunderstanding, this thesis seeks to create space for analytic philosophy to inform 
and clarify what is entailed in the question. That is, I hope my thesis contributes to 
scholarship insofar as it develops a more ideal language for answering the question.  
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The second and more important contribution is that my thesis develops a response 
to whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Though this has been done 
countless times in the research, my thesis tries to develop an argument influenced by 
analytic philosophy. By building on the current research with analytic philosophy, I hope 
to make an original contribution by arguing that Muslims and Christians refer to but do 
not worship the same God.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE ENTAILMENTS OF REFERENCE AND PREDICATON 
Introduction 
 The primary aim of this chapter is to clarify what is entailed in reference and 
predication as they relate to God. Since this thesis seeks to answer whether Muslims and 
Christians worship the same God from a philosophical perspective, clarifying the ways in 
which language and its various parts function is of utmost importance. Of those parts, 
reference and predication are most significant, given that an answer to the question must 
track with the philosophical parameters of how to speak of God. Thus this chapter tries to 
identify the exactitudes of reference and predication since they are essential for 
answering whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God.  
There is also increasing need to identify the exactitudes of reference and 
predication, given that the wider research on the topic has inadequately assumed what 
they entail. For example, Tomas Bogardus and Mallorie Urban introduce a philosophical 
roadmap for how to decide whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God.1 
They maintain that a decision on this matter has everything to do with what determines 
the reference of a proper name (e.g., God, Nikola Jokic). More specifically, they argue 
that the way proper names acquire their referents influences how we decide if Muslims 
and Christians worship the same God. Bogardus and Urban in this way pinpoint the 
 
1. Tomas Bogardus and Malorie Urban, “How to Tell Whether Christians and Muslims Worship 
the Same God,” Faith and Philosophy 34.2 (2017): 176–200. 
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major issues regarding reference when it comes to whether Muslims and Christians 
worship the same God. However, they neither define nor describe the function of 
reference, which makes their use of reference liable to misappropriation. 
In a similar way, there are some like George, Volf, and Turner who look beyond 
reference and argue that predication plays a fundamental role in deciding whether 
Muslims and Christians worship the same God.2 They argue the characteristics (e.g., 
attributes, modes) in which Muslims and Christians predicate of God determines whether 
they worship the same God. As such, inquiry into whether Muslims and Christians 
worship the same God depends on whether their conceptions of God are compatible. 
However, much in the same way as Bogardus and Urban, these scholars do not describe 
what is entailed in predication. The consequence is that ill-defined terms (i.e., reference 
and predication) lead to misguided decisions on whether Muslims and Christians worship 
the same God. 
Therefore I clarify the functions of reference and predication to mend these 
inconsistencies in the research. This explication will demonstrate that reference and 
predication are distinct linguistic and cognitional functions that generate radically 
different outcomes that, if conflated, detract from the pragmatism of using philosophy of 
language to answer the question at hand. Therefore by clarifying what is entailed in 
reference and predication, this chapter is a preliminary step for assessing whether 
Muslims and Christians worship the same God. 
 
2. Turner, “Christians, Muslims, and the Name of God”; Volf, Allah: A Christian Response; 
George, Is the Father of Jesus the God of Muhammad. 
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By drawing upon Lowe and Evans and their depictions of reference and 
predication, I determine that reference primarily tracks, picks out, and states and acquires 
information about entities while predication elucidates entities by their ontological 
character. By determining the functions of reference and predication, I am able to make 
two distinctions that aid my decision of whether Muslims and Christians worship the 
same God. First, though reference and predication help create meaningful statements out 
physical and theoretical realities, they are unique and independent functions that cannot 
be conflated. 
Second, predication should be consigned into two distinct but related categories. 
The first category I call generic predication. Generic predication is understood as a 
linguistic or cognitional function that alludes to entities in a vague sense. The second 
category is what I call specific predication. Like generic predication, specific predication 
is a linguistic or cognitional function. However, instead of alluding to entities in a vague 
sense, specific predicates do so in an irreducible and unique sense. Thus by consigning 
predication into two distinct yet related categories, I seek to develop a more ideal use of 
predication. 
Clarifying Reference 
Reference, classically conceived, holds between a linguistic or cognitional 
element on the one hand and a physical or theoretical reality on the other hand.3 By 
pairing or linking a word or thought with an entity, referential relations allow for 
particular entities to be tracked, picked out, and have information stated or acquired about 
 
3. Michael Devitt, “Reference,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 8:153–64, and Timothy 
Williamson, “Reference,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy 8:290–95. 
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them. For example, when Nikola Jokic is asserted, the proper name (i.e., the linguistic or 
cognitional element) refers to a particular individual that plays professional basketball 
and not to some other individual. As such, referential relations rule out entities so that the 
appropriate entity can be properly referenced. Though reference is generally more 
complex than the previous example illustrates, the basic components of referential 
relations hold between a linguistic or cognitional element and an entity. 
The underlining intent of referential relations is to create meaningful statements 
or concepts by tracking, picking out, and stating or acquiring information about entities. 
By pairing or linking a word or thought with an entity, reality is logically configured in 
such a way that generates meaningful statements or concepts. For this reason, referential 
relations are considered the core of linguistic and cognitional meaning.4 Given its 
particular function, referential relations generate meaningful statements or concepts 
insofar as the word or thought remains properly paired or linked to the entity. For 
instance, “Nikola Jokic is a Serbian basketball player” is a meaningful statement only to 
the extent that the proper name remains paired or linked to the individual associated with 
“is a Serbian basketball player.” For any reason the referential relation fails and the 
proper name is not linked or paired to the entity, the statement “Nikola Jokic is a Serbian 
basketball player” becomes meaningless. This function is characterized in the following 
deductive terms:  
 
‘x is y’ is meaningful if and only if the entity referred to by x is entity y.  
 
 
4. Devitt, “Reference,” 8:153–64. 
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Eliminate this relation between the linguistic or cognitional element, and the entity and 
the statement or concept becomes meaningless. The contours of reference thus hold 
between a linguistic or cognitional element and an entity with the function of tracking, 
picking out, stating or acquiring information about a particular entity.5   
To ensure clarity of thought, I take it that the ability to track or pick out an entity 
is intuitive with respect to referential relations; however, it is not clear what kind of 
information is stated or acquired during referential relations. Moreover, it is not clear 
what within a referential relation generates information. In other words, when a word or 
thought is paired or linked to an entity, what about that relationship is informative and 
how does it happen? 
In its most basic form, information is generated when a word or thought is paired 
or linked with an entity, though the caveat is that the relationship between a word or 
thought and the entity does not always elucidate information. The only time when 
referential relations are informative is when reference is fixed by description.6 Reference 
by description takes place when a word or a thought contains descriptive content and is 
paired or linked to an entity. This elucidates information about the entity given that the 
word or thought (when properly paired or linked) is associated with descriptive content 
about the entity. A different way of explaining this dynamic is to say that words and 
thoughts contain sense. On this construal, names and thoughts often contain sensible 
content that when properly paired or linked with an entity, the name or thought elucidates 
 
5. It should be noted that these examples are not the only way to refer to entities. These examples 
feature what is commonly called the referential theory of proper names. Though this theory demonstrates 
the basic structure of referential relations, there are several other theories of reference. These cannot be 
explained in the immediate context, but they will be touched upon in chapter 3. 
6. Gareth Evans, “Reference and Contingency,” The Monist 62.2 (1979): 161–89. 
 
 
 
16 
the descriptive content and thus generates information. Explained as either accentuating 
descriptive content or sense, when a word or thought is paired or linked to an entity, the 
likely result is that information is generated. 
For example, take my association with Nikola Jokic. Upon use of Nikola Jokic, it 
is more plausible the proper name will invoke “the basketball player from Serbia” rather 
than some other entity.7 This is because my association with Nikola Jokic is tied to the 
individual that satisfies the description “the basketball player from Serbia.”8 In other 
words, the only (or more dominant) association with Nikola Jokic is the entity that 
satisfies “the basketball player from Serbia.” My association thus accentuates information 
about the entity denoted by Nikola Jokic because the proper name is connected to 
descriptive content or sense.9  
Clarifying Predication 
Unlike reference, predication neither tracks, picks out, nor states or acquires 
information about entities. Rather predication is a relation between two (or more) entities 
(e.g., objects, individuals, attributes, modes) that, in light of their relationship, clarify the 
kind of ‘thing’ each of these entities is. Predication occurs when either one entity is said 
of or inheres in another entity with the intent to categorize these entities into a categorial 
 
7. Evans, “Reference and Contingency,” 161–67. 
8. An interesting exception to this referential relation is if an individual does not have access to the 
only (or dominant) association with the entity. Though I cannot say much about this exception, it is helpful 
to note that the entity intending to be referenced will be unidentifiable until other association are added to 
the entity’s dossier in a way that properly elucidates the entity 
9. Proper names are not the only linguistic or cognitional elements that are informative with 
regards to reference. Descriptions can also be informational within the contours of reference. Simply by 
pairing or linking a description (the linguistic or cognitional element) with an entity accentuates 
information much like proper names can do.  
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(an a priori) structure of reality.10 As a basic example, take the previous statement, 
“Nikola Jokic is a Serbian basketball player.” In this example, the individual denoted by 
Nikola Jokic represents the linguistic or cognitional element while “a Serbian basketball 
player” represents the predicate. From an ontological perspective, Nikola Jokic represents 
a substance since humans are traditionally categorized as a species while “a Serbian 
basketball player” is a property because it represents an attribute of being. Therefore, as a 
result of its relational quality (i.e., entity is predicate), predication helps ontologically 
categorize entities by their respective kinds. Understood as a relation between two (or 
more) independent entities, predication helps locate entities by ontological category. 
Though predicates neither track, pick out, nor state or acquire information about 
entities, they help referential relations accomplish this function. Given that predication 
primarily accentuates the ontological category of entities, when done properly, it helps 
pair and link words or thoughts with entities. For example, in the statement “Nikola Jokic 
is a Serbian basketball player,” the predicate clarifies the individual denoted by the 
proper name and the cluster information associated with that individual. In a sense, 
predicates aid referential relations because they clarify which entity a linguistic or 
cognitional element is referencing. The outcome of elucidating the ontological character 
of entities makes it more viable to track, pick out, and state or acquire information about 
entities such as Nikola Jokic. Therefore predicates aid referential relations because they 
clarify entities by ontological category (e.g., type, genus, attribute, mode). 
 
10. A categorial structure of reality simply divides reality into essential ontological categories and 
comments on their relationships between them. 
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In other words, predicates individuate entities and, as a result, entities are more 
readily referenced.11 For example, take the previous statement “Nikola Jokic is a Serbian 
basketball player.” As said already, upon use of Nikola Jokic, the proper name intends to 
refer to a particular individual. Yet simply asserting Nikola Jokic does not always mean 
that the individual denoted by the proper name has been referenced. There are, of course, 
ways that reference can be interrupted or redirected.12 One way to increase the 
possibilities that reference is not interrupted or redirected is to clarify the ontological 
character of the individual denoted by Nikola Jokic. By clarifying the ontological 
character of Nikola Jokic, there is a greater likelihood that the correct individual is 
referenced. 
To illustrate this inference, say a colleague and I are attending a basketball game 
with the intent to watch Nikola Jokic. To my colleague’s dismay, she is unfamiliar with 
the National Basketball Association (NBA) and has little clue as to who we have come to 
watch. From this point on, most statements that I make about Nikola Jokic lack meaning 
for my colleague given that she is unfamiliar with which individual is being referenced. 
Even a statement such as “Nikola Jokic is a Serbian basketball player” is void of meaning 
for my colleague because it lacks reference to a particular individual.13 Every statement 
 
11. Evans, “Reference and Contingency,” 162–66. 
12. Though there are several ways reference can be interrupted or redirected, I will explain two in 
order to illustrate this point. (1) Reference can be interrupted simply in the case where two entities share the 
same word (e.g., name) or thought (e.g., idea). For example, there could be two individuals with the same 
name Nikola Jokic. In cases such as this, there is no way to know, outside of acquiring more information 
about the individuals, what individual is being referenced when the name Nikola Jokic is used. (2) 
Reference can also be interrupted or redirected in virtue of the fact that the entity is unknown. For instance, 
if the proper name Nikola Jokic is asserted and I do not know anyone (or anything) with that name, 
reference will be interrupted or redirected. 
13. Furthermore, it could also be the case that my colleague is unfamiliar with the NBA, thus this 
too would lack meaning for her. 
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in this sense that does not clarify the ontological character of Nikola Jokic lacks meaning 
for my colleague. 
So to draw attention to Nikola Jokic, I would need to first determine his 
ontological character. This, of course, could be done by predicating various 
characteristics held true about him (e.g., jersey number, height). In terms of deductive 
logic, predicates operate in the following way: 
 
predicate p helps identify entity e if and only if p elucidates the ontological status 
of e in light of a linguistic or cognitional element w. 
 
Often without the assistance of a p, a w is unable to refer to an e. Though not 
indispensable for referential relations, predication is significant for elucidating the 
ontological character of entities that facilitates referential relations.14  
Not unlike reference, however, the aim of predication is to make sense of reality 
through ontological categories. By helping elucidate the type, genus, attribute, or mode of 
entities that are otherwise ambiguous, predicates make physical or theoretical realities 
meaningful.15 That is, predicates individuate entities so that they can be set apart from all 
 
14. It should be noted that predicates do not only assist referential relations. Rather a predicate in 
and of itself can act as the linguistic or cognitional element in the framework of reference. Known as the 
demonstrative use, predicates can be paired or linked with an entity by simply pointing to it. For instance, 
without using the linguistic or cognitional element Nikola Jokic, I could simply point to the individual 
denoted by Nikola Jokic and say, “That is a Serbian basketball player.” In this way, I would be directly 
pairing or linking an individual with the predicate (i.e., “a Serbian basketball player”) and thus bypassing 
the proper name all together.  
15. E. J. Lowe, “Categorial Predication,” Ratio 25 (2012): 383–86.      
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other entities.16 Thus the principle function of predication is to categorize entities by their 
ontological character. 
Common Mistake Made with Reference and Predication 
  The ability to make the distinction between the functions of reference and 
predication is paramount for any argument that uses a philosophy of language. Failure to 
make this distinction leads to the notion that predication is primarily used to establish the 
identity of entities with the intent to refer to them.17 This is conceived in simple dyadic 
terms: p = e,18 where p is stated about e exclusively with the aim to establish e’s identity 
in order that it can be referenced. Under these pretenses, predication retains its relational 
character between two (or more) entities but does so to exclusively elucidate the identity 
of entities so that they can be referenced. 
Though an important aim, the inability to understand the particular functions of 
reference and predication obscures their particular uses. For instance, the dyadic nature 
often used to secure the identity of entities maintains little to no recognition of an 
ontological structure of reality. This is because a p = e structure does not qualify entities 
by ontological category, which leaves entities with little (if any) independent and distinct 
characteristics that keep them from being confused with other entities. A dyadic structure 
obscures referential relations because it does not accommodate any notion of “what there 
is” in reality. Simply attributing p of e does not say anything ontological about p or e 
 
16. Evans, “Reference and Contingency,” 162–66. 
17. This is not to say that failure to make the current distinction results only in predicates being 
used dyadically. There could be an alternate result by failing to make this distinction. However, my 
inference is that failure to make this distinction primarily results in dyadic form. 
18. Lowe, “Categorial Predication,” 369–71. 
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given that neither is qualified. The result is that e is not identified and p maintains little (if 
any) meaning. The claims about reality that arise from this “thin and superficial” 
understanding of reference and predication are what Lowe calls “ontology lite” since 
there is nothing remotely ontological about a dyadic structure.19  
In less analytical terms, failure to make this distinction is epitomized in Volf’s 
construal of whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Building his 
argument on sufficient similarity, he concludes that Muslims and Christians worship the 
same God given that they predicate similar and at times identical “things” of God. 
However, the way in which he maintains this argument does not appeal to a categorial 
structure of reality. When he argues that Muslims and Christians agree that God is one, 
creator, good, love, and entirely different from creation, it is unclear what exactly Volf 
believes they agree on.20 The simple fact that he does not commit himself to an 
ontological structure of reality makes his claim that Muslims and Christians maintain 
“agreement on these [five predicates]” ambiguous at best.21  
The outcome is that without a formal commitment to an ontological structure of 
reality, his argument that Muslims and Christians share a common set of predicates is, in 
Lowe’s mind, superficial. What arises from this ambiguous claim is that Muslims and 
Christians agree upon five predicative “things” but it does not qualify what exactly those 
“things” happen to be. For instance, he argues that Islam and Christianity agree that God 
 
19. Lowe, “Categorial Predication,” 369–71. 
20. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 95–110. 
21. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 110. 
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is good.22 However, outside of a thin scriptural witness (1 John 4:16; Al Buruj, 85:14), 
Volf establishes neither the exactitudes of the Islamic nor the Christian conception of 
God’s goodness.23 All that arises from his claim is that Islam and Christianity agree upon 
a predicative “thing” that they mutually call “goodness.” But what Muslims and 
Christians agree upon about the predicative “thing” they call “goodness” is arbitrary 
given that Volf’s construal lacks a categorial structure of reality. 
One must infer from this lack of philosophical analysis that Volf’s project has 
little (if any) normative value in assessing whether Muslims and Christians worship the 
same God. If basic distinctions such as the current one are conflated, the use of 
philosophical terms such as reference and predication can only be misleading.24 Many 
find Volf’s argument convincing largely because he claims that Muslims and Christians 
agree upon many key theological truths.25 As determined, however, Volf uses 
philosophical terms like reference and predication, yet does not understand their 
particular functions. Therefore because he is unable to ascertain nuanced distinctions, his 
project remains, on the one hand, imprecise and uncritical and, on the other hand, 
misleading. 
 
22. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 99–101. 
23. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 101. 
24. Remember what he says toward the apex of his argument: “When Christians and Muslims 
agree [that God is one, creator, good, love, and entirely different from creation], then in their worship of 
God they refer to the same object” (original emphasis). 
25. This is not to say that further evaluation of the subdisciplines of philosophy (e.g., philosophy 
of mind, philosophy of religion, epistemology) and, more broadly, the fields of theology and history will 
not lead one to say that Muslims and Christians worship the same God. However, this is to say that 
imprecise and “superficial” arguments have no place in this area or any area of inquiry. 
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People who have read Volf on this topic will point to the fact that his argument 
appeals to scriptural witness rather than philosophical evidence. Under these pretenses, it 
would be emphasized that Muslims and Christians maintain a similar scriptural 
perspective and thus share several common predicates of God (e.g., good, love). 
However, this position seems question begging insofar as the argument relies upon the 
premise that Scripture develops and maintains a formal commitment to a categorial 
structure of reality. Though I am not in a position to formally make this argument, it is 
unlikely that Scripture upholds a formal commitment on ontology. Regardless of his 
appeal to a Scriptural witness, there remains no ontological commitment that supports his 
position that Muslims and Christians share a common set of theological predicates.26  
Toward Further Clarity of Predication 
 With a proper understanding of reference and predication and the dangers that 
company their conflation, I am in a position to determine more precisely how predicates 
function. By employing a categorial structure of reality, the following section works 
toward a two-part distinction in predication. Because predicates clarify what constitutes a 
particular entity by ontological character (i.e., type, genus, attribute, mode), it is intuitive 
that some predicates would do this in a more irreducible and unique way than others. 
Take, for example, the difference between what I am calling generic and specific 
predicates. Generic predicates are exemplified in statements such as “Nikola Jokic is 
tall.” Here we have a linguistic or cognitional element (i.e., the proper name) and a 
 
26. For more on this point, see Jon McGinnis, “The hiddenness of ‘divine hiddenness’: divine love 
in medieval Islamic lands,” in Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives, ed. Adam Green 
and Eleonore Stump (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 157–74. In his essay, he presents 
convincing evidence that the Islamic and Christian conceptions of God’s love are different claims. He 
thinks that the theological and philosophical conceptions of the Trinity and Tawhid greatly affect how 
predicates (particularly the predicate of love) operate in the life of God. 
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predicate (i.e., the characteristic) that informs us about a specific individual. In this 
example, however, the characteristic (i.e., tall) is not an irreducible or unique predicate 
exclusively of Nikola Jokic. Instead the predicate remains nonspecific with regards to 
quality and extent and clarifies only a particular entity’s ontological character in a vague 
sense. Therefore, generic predicates primarily convey the ontological type, genus, 
attribute, or mode of entities that are not indicative exclusively of only one entity. 
 To explain further, say my colleague and I are at the same sporting event as 
previously discussed. My colleague, at this point, has apparently come to recognize 
Nikola Jokic and says, “Nikola Jokic is large.” Here my colleague is using a generic 
predicate (i.e., large) with the intent to categorize the individual she believes we have 
come to watch by his ontological character. By alluding to the individual with a 
nonspecific predicate, my colleague has said something ontologically true but not 
irreducible or unique of Nikola Jokic.  
Yet someone might ask, “Why does ‘large’ constitute a generic predicate if we 
have reason to suppose that your colleague is referencing the correct individual and 
‘large’ is contextually indicative of that individual?” Put differently, if by indication 
Nikola Jokic is large, why does it constitute a generic predicate? 
Though a reasonable question, there are nevertheless convincing reasons to 
suggest otherwise: (1) Even though large is indicative of Nikola Jokic, the predicate lacks 
any qualification on the extent or quality of his individual largeness. Simply predicating 
large, though informative, is not precise exclusively of Nikola Jokic. In a different sense, 
large is a relative claim given that it merely determines that Nikola Jokic is not short 
(whatever that may imply). Therefore my colleague uses a predicate without further 
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qualification. (2) Provided that this is a professional sporting event, large is not, by all 
likelihood, specific to one individual. There are other individuals on the basketball court 
who would be considered large. Contextually speaking, the predicate is not specific to 
Nikola Jokic exclusively. Thus given the ontological ambiguity accompanying (1) and 
(2), there is adequate evidence to catalogue large as a generic predicate. In other words, if 
there is little qualification with respect to (1) and (2), then predicates like large should be 
regarded as generic in kind. 
Yet someone might reply, “True, large qualifies as a generic predicate in this 
situation given (1) and (2); however, what if the context changes and Nikola Jokic is 
playing basketball in a ‘vacuum.’ Would large not specify something irreducible and 
unique of Nikola Jokic?” That is, if one and only one individual satisfies the predicate 
large from a contextual perspective, can it not be said that the predicate is irreducible and 
unique of the individual? Not necessarily. At best this scenario bypasses (2).27 Yet there 
still remains no resolve with (1) given that there is little clarification with respect to 
extent or quality accompanying a statement such as “Nikola Jokic is large.” 
As for specific predication, take the following example: “Nikola Jokic is the 41st 
overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft.” Like several of the previous examples, there is 
linguistic or cognitional element (i.e., Nikola Jokic) that is further clarified by a predicate 
(i.e., the 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft). Unlike in previous examples, this 
predicate is irreducible and unique to a particular individual that cannot be true of any 
other entity. Instead of vaguely alluding to Nikola Jokic with generic predicates, a 
 
27. Though I think this specific example does not bypass inference (2), I want to keep the 
possibility open that an example like it could actually do so. It seems that a more accurate predicate in a 
similar example could bypass inference (2). 
 
 
 
26 
specific predicate refers to Nikola Jokic in a noncontingent manner. By drawing attention 
to one specific individual, this kind of predicate rules out all other entities. So specific 
predicates clarify, like their generic counterpart, by ontological type, genus, attribute, and 
mode, though specific predicates do so by what is irreducible and unique of an entity. 
To illustrate what is entailed in specific predicates, take the following criteria. The 
first is that specific predicates express the ontological type, genus, attribute, or mode held 
true about a specific entity. As the previous example illuminates, Nikola Jokic is the only 
individual that satisfies the 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft.28 No other 
individual, properly speaking, is able to satisfy such a predicate. It is irreducible and 
unique exclusively of Nikola Jokic given that he is in fact the 41st overall pick in the 
2014 NBA draft. Thus as the first criterion, specific predicates are true of one and only 
one entity. 
The second criterion is best articulated in what Bruce Marshall calls “communal 
centrality and epistemic primacy.”29 According to Marshall, there are certain beliefs in a 
community that maintain precedence over other beliefs. Largely based on their 
normativity, some beliefs are privileged, given that a community’s identity is built around 
 
28. It should be noted that while the 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft is particular to the 
individual represented by Nikola Jokic, there are ways that the predicate could be indicative of a different 
individual altogether. For instance, instead of reflecting the individual represented by Nikola Jokic, this 
predicate could be used in the context of a fictional character (e.g., Saturday Night Live) where the 
predicate would be indictive of someone who is not the actual individual. In other words, there are 
exceptions to this example, though I would argue that such examples are rare and thus unwarranted 
objections against the current argument.  
29. Bruce Marshall, Trinity and Truth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 44–49. 
Provided that this project is specifically focused on a philosophy of language, the terminology of 
epistemology in Marshall’s project should not be confused as being indicative of my project. Though 
epistemology has implications for the current topic, I am not specifically dealing those in my project. 
Therefore, even though Marshall’s project uses epistemology, I am still using his current terminology, 
given that it highlights what is entailed in specific predication. 
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a limited set of core beliefs. Though this “sound[s] arcane,” Marshall nevertheless argues 
that this notion is a presupposition among most thinking people.30 To prove this 
inference, take the following example: Suppose my colleague believes (A) that Nikola 
Jokic is a top twenty-five basketball player and (B) no top twenty-five basketball player 
is European.31 Both of these beliefs, of course, cannot be maintained under the rules of 
logic because Nikola Jokic is regarded as a top twenty-five basketball player and is 
ethnically Serb. Given the apparent conflict, one belief must be modified in relation to the 
other if either (or both) of them is to be maintained. In this instance, belief (B) must 
change provided that Nikola Jokic is, on the one hand, a top twenty-five basketball player 
and, on the other hand, belief (A) is primary between the two beliefs.32  
The importance of this concept for the current thesis is why beliefs such as (A) 
are fundamental for communal identity. In the simplest of terms, Marshall maintains that 
beliefs such as (A) are fundamental for communal identity because they are what he 
terms essential and central beliefs.33 In light of the first, beliefs like (A) are essential 
because the identity (or authenticity) of a community depends upon them for its own 
preservation. If essential beliefs are not preserved in a community, its identity and 
subsequently the community will cease to exist. That is because beliefs like (A) orient 
members of a community to embrace a common vision that is representative of their 
 
30. Marshall, Trinity and Truth, 46. 
31. This is modified from Marshall’s example. For the original example, see Trinity and Truth, 
46–47. 
32. I take it that belief (A) is more dominant simply by intuition. There could be instances, I 
suppose, where belief (B) is more dominant than belief (A). Of course, some of this will depend upon the 
content of the beliefs and some of it will depend upon the identity of the community making the delineation 
between two (or more) beliefs. 
33. Marshall, Trinity and Truth, 44–49. 
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identity. Without an agreed upon list of essential beliefs, a community does not have 
common vision to unite on that would preserve its existence. Second, beliefs like (A) are 
central because they are indispensable for the preservation of a community and become 
the “most characteristic among [a] particular collection of beliefs.” These kinds of beliefs 
become central to the community because they are the core convictions among its 
members. Since omission of beliefs such as (A) results in the loss of a community’s 
identity, they are maintained unapologetically. Understood in this way, a community 
maintains certain beliefs as essential for its existence and in turn protects them by making 
them central within its belief structure.  
If Marshall is correct, the outcome of holding some beliefs as essential and central 
is paramount for understanding the second criterion of specific predicates. As stated 
above, if a conflict arises between two beliefs (e.g., beliefs (A) and (B) above), it 
necessitates a reorganization of the beliefs maintained in a community. This can be done 
in one of two ways. The first way is to reject outright the less important of the two 
beliefs. In the situation that two beliefs are incompatible, the more essential and central of 
the two beliefs is kept while the other one is omitted from the belief structure. The second 
way is more nuanced where the less important belief is modified with the intent to 
establish congruency between it and the more essential and central belief. By working 
toward the harmonization of the belief structure, the more essential and central belief 
holds precedence over the less important belief. As such, the less important belief is 
modified while the more essential and central belief is maintained in its original sense. 
Either situation restructures beliefs in a way that circumvents inconsistency by complying 
with the more essential and central of the beliefs.    
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To succinctly articulate the distinction between generic and specific predication, 
being said of is characteristic of specific predicates, while being in (or inhering in) is 
characteristic of generic predicates.34 That is, specific predicates express what is 
irreducible and unique of an entity while generic predicates are more universal in reality. 
The distinction between generic and specific predication, then, is primarily ontological 
where entities are configured into a categorial structure of reality. From this perspective, 
generic and specific predicates comprise (in the technical sense) predication; however, 
they elucidate entities by different ontological means that make sense of physical or 
theoretical realities in their own respective way.  
Predication as It Relates to Theology 
It is now essential to identify the theological implications of generic and specific 
predication. Given their categorial distinction, generic and specific predication 
accommodate implications for how to speak of God. I thus seek to determine the 
predicates that Muslims and Christians attribute to God as they relate to this categorial 
distinction. As illustrated in the example offered by Volf, it is not enough to simply say 
that Muslims and Christians agree upon a set of theological predicates apart from a 
categorial structure of reality. Therefore, I outline the various theological implications of 
generic and specific predication that ultimately safeguards my project from a “thin and 
superficial” ontological perspective. 
The first is that predicative phrases such as “God is good” or “God, you are 
loving” are, under my categorial distinction, generic in kind.35 On the one hand, neither 
 
34. Lowe, “Categorial Predication,” 369–86. 
35. In the Islamic tradition, this would entail the ninety-nine beautiful names of God. For a list and 
philosophical explanation of them, see Al-Ghazālī, The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, trans. David 
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“God is love” nor “God, you are good” is irreducible or unique exclusively of God. 
Because there is little (if any) qualification with respect to extent or quality, these 
predicates cannot be attributed exclusively to God. For instance, it is not unreasonable to 
say that “Nikola Jokic is good” or “Nikola Jokic, you are loving” when the context lends 
such predicative phrases. On the other hand, though predicative phrases such as “God is 
good” and “God, you are loving” are significant from a theological perspective, neither is 
essential or central as Marshall describes.36 That is, predicative phrases like “God is 
good” and “God, you are loving” are not the most fundamental beliefs for either the 
Islamic or Christian communities. There are still other beliefs that are more essential and 
central that would hold sway over God’s goodness and love. Therefore, predicative 
phrases such as these should be regarded as generic in kind since they clarify what is 
neither irreducible nor unique exclusively of God. 
The second of the predicative phrases “God is Triune” and “God is Tawhid” 
should be regarded as specific in kind.37 Unsurprisingly antithetical to the contours of 
 
B. Burrell (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1992). One might also see Nader El-Bizri, “God: 
essence and attributes,” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 121–40. 
36. This, of course, is with orthodox Muslims and Christians in mind. I am thus bracketing off 
nonorthodox communities and their particular theological outlooks for logistical reasons. Given the 
project’s length, I do not have room to explain the factors that would be entailed with unorthodox positions.  
37. This may be shortsighted; however, I do not think there are any other predicates that maintain 
the contours of specific predicates. Though I think the Incarnation (and subsequently the crucifixion) is 
primary and could be argued to be a specific predicate, it seems that Trinity is an all in compassing claim 
about God. It is the incarnation that leads to Trinitarian theology. The incarnation focuses on the second 
person of the Triune God, not the Triune God in and of Godself. Thus I find the Trinity to be a more basic 
claim about God in and of Godself than the incarnation. The Trinity is a more totalizing claim about God 
than the incarnation. In light of such a construal, I think the Trinity is the only predicate that is specific in 
kind.  
As for the Islamic tradition, it seems that Tawhid is scripturally and theologically the apex of the 
Islamic conception of God. All other predicates seem peripheral. If God is in anyway numerically 
compounded, then all other predicates do not have an operative basis in the life of God given that God 
would be unable to subsist. Thus to reflect this theological perspective, God is always affirmed in God’s 
oneness in the Islamic tradition (though it could be argued that even oneness is numerical).  
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generic predication, these predicative phrases would be considered specific for two 
reasons. The first is that, for their corresponding communities, “God is Trinity” and “God 
is Tawhid” are irreducible and unique exclusively of God. There is nothing from the 
standpoint of philosophical theology that could satisfy the ontological character of either 
the Trinity or Tawhid other than God. They are so specific with regard to extent and 
quality that neither could be embodied by anything other than God. In other words, the 
Trinity and Tawhid are so philosophically and theologically particular that it is 
inconceivable that they could be indicative of any other entity aside from God. 
The second is that the Trinity and Tawhid qualify as theologically essential and 
central for their corresponding communities. One way of illustrating their essential and 
central character is showcasing their rudimentary quality in liturgical rites.38 For instance, 
the Trinity is not only invoked for Christians in eucharistic practice, but it is also 
saturated throughout the liturgy (e.g., creedal statements, signum crucis). Remove 
Trinitarian language and imagery from the liturgy, and the community no longer has the 
theological basis that unites them. As argued by George, exclusion of the Trinity also 
excludes doctrines and beliefs such as the incarnation and crucifixion from these 
liturgical rites. The Trinity in this sense binds together several core Christian beliefs that 
are not easily omitted from the community. Likewise, Tawhid is the theological basis 
 
It also should be noted that “low churches” (Protestant in kind) will probably deemphasize the 
central and essential quality of the Trinity as depicted here. For reasons of emphasis, the incarnation (and 
subsequently the crucifixion) will probably assume primacy. This, however, should not cause any 
confusion when it comes to evaluating my argument. As I said above, I take the Trinity to be the only 
predicate irreducible and unique of God, with the assumption that the incarnation reflects in the Trinity. 
That is, my thesis focuses on God in God’s totality (i.e., Father, Son, and Spirit). Though the Incarnation is 
paramount for Trinitarian theology, it nevertheless focuses primarily on the second person of a Triune God. 
38. Marshall, Trinity and Truth, 24. 
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within Islamic liturgical rites. Invoked not only during the Shahada (profession of faith), 
it is also recited at the beginning and end of each liturgical cycle.39 Moreover, the 
elimination of Tawhid would result in the negation or adaption of Adhan (the call to 
prayer) that united Muslims everywhere at least three to five times per day. The doctrine 
of Tawhid in this way upholds Islamic identity. Depicted in the rhythms of liturgy then, 
the Trinity and Tawhid are essential and central because their corresponding communities 
are built on and promoted by them.40 
An initial objection to the distinction between generic and specific predicates as 
they relate to God is what I call an argument from mysticism. The argument goes as 
follows:  
 
(3) If God is mysterious, then God’s ontological status is unknown. 
(4) God is mysterious as maintained by Muslims and Christians. 
(5) Thus neither Muslims nor Christians have access to God’s ontological status. 
(6) Thus any distinction made between generic and specific predicates is pointless 
because God is utterly mysterious. 
 
 
39. Shahada in its religious sense denotes the Islamic profession of faith: “I bear witness that there 
is no deity but God, and I bear witness that Muhammad is the massager of God.” 
40. If there still remains doubt concerning specific predicates as they relate to God, take one more 
example of how Islam and Christianity promote the Trinity and Tawhid. As illustrated by Meghan Sullivan, 
Islam and Christianity concern themselves with the misattribution of belief about God. Both traditions 
agree on the prohibition of sacrilegious speech epitomized in Exod 20: “You shall not make wrongful use 
of the name of the Lord your God, for the Lord will not acquit anyone who misuses his name.” In this 
sense, Islam and Christianity maintain a keen interest in upholding right belief about God that their moral 
fabric reflects. See Meghan Sullivan, “Semitics for Blasphemy,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of 
Religion vol 4, ed. Jonathan L Kvanvig (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 159–72. 
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By enlarging the ontological dissimilarity between God and humanity, this argument 
downplays doctrinal insights to mitigate conflicting theological insights. Though an 
appealing argument, this approach overstates the mysterious character of God. From the 
beginning of the argument in premise (3), the claim seems to be built on the assumption 
that mystery entails ontological obscurity in the life of God. This results in the 
deemphasis of justified belief (e.g., revelation, sensory perception). Such an assumption 
makes it difficult for religious communities to construct a theological basis that unites 
people because a theological basis requires warranted beliefs. Thus it is difficult to 
imagine how a community would maintain its identity aside from retaining warranted 
beliefs. 
 A more substantive objection is to argue that predicative phrases such as “God is 
good” and “God, you are loving” qualify as essential and central beliefs. Goodness and 
love are fundamental attributes in God’s essence as maintained by Muslims and 
Christians, so much so that if neither were true, God would cease to subsist and 
subsequently creation would lack the sustenance for its preservation (i.e., providence). 
Thus the objection is that the goodness and love of God must be essential and central 
beliefs because the phenomenal world remains stable and intact. 
Though attentive to detail, such an objection misunderstands what is entailed in 
beliefs that are essential and central. As previously mentioned, beliefs that are essential 
and central maintain precedence over other beliefs. However, precedence does not always 
mean that other less fundamental beliefs must be omitted. Instead, when one belief 
maintains precedence over another belief, the less fundamental of the two needs only to 
be modified in relation to the belief that is essential and central. Though occasionally two 
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beliefs will be incompatible with one another, it does not necessarily follow that they 
cannot be modified in a way that makes them harmonious. For instance, if the Trinity or 
Tawhid is maintained as primary in a belief structure, less rudimentary beliefs such as 
goodness and love do not necessarily need to be omitted. Instead beliefs such as goodness 
and love need only to be modified to fit a Trinitarian or Tawhidian conception of God.41 
Conclusion 
 Within this chapter I have outlined and developed two major distinctions in 
philosophy of language as it relates to God. The first was between reference and 
predication. I claimed that reference primarily holds between a linguistic or cognitional 
element and a physical or theoretical entity that allow for entities to be tracked, picked 
out, and information stated or acquired about them. On the flip side, I argued that 
predication clarifies what kind of “thing” an entity is from an ontological perspective. 
The second was between generic and specific predicates. I argued that generic predicates 
are nonspecific with regard to quality and extent and clarify only by ontological type, 
genus, attribute, or mode in a vague sense. As for specific predicates, I claimed that they 
express, on the one hand, what is irreducible and unique of an entity while, on the other 
hand, they are the most essential and central claims about an entity. Thus generic 
predicates are more universal in reality while specific predicates are indicative of only 
one entity. 
 
41. This should make good sense to those who are familiar with contemporary theology. For 
example, as recent scholarship has tried to show, it makes good philosophical sense that if God is Triune, 
then God must necessarily be a relational sort of being. Given that God is conceived as three persons in 
one Godhead, it must necessarily follow that God is relational in and of the three persons of the Trinity. As 
such, scholars in this sense have predicated the notion of relation to God in light of a Trinitarian conviction. 
In this way, scholars have modified the ways in which we predicate characteristics of God to fit a 
Trinitarian conception such as the predicate of relation. For a good first read on this point, see Richard 
Swinburne, The Christian God (New York: University of Oxford Press, 1994), 170–91. 
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 Serving as preliminary distinctions for my forthcoming argument, I am in a 
position to answer whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Thus in the 
next chapter I turn to answer the question based on philosophy of language. 
 36 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
THEY REFER TO BUT DO NOT WORSHIP 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I determine that Muslims and Christians refer to but do not 
worship the same God. I advance this claim with two lines of argumentation. The first 
illustrates that reference takes hold at the junction between a causal-historical account 
and a list of descriptions held true about a particular entity. I determine from this that 
Muslims and Christians cooperatively meet both conditions for reference and thus refer to 
the same God. This conclusion primarily hinges upon a shared monotheism and a 
common set of generic predicates. The second determines that reference is not equivalent 
to worship. Most vividly illustrated in liturgical rites, worship entails particular and 
concrete predicates held true about entities. Between these arguments, I establish that 
reference primarily operates with respect to generic predication while worship entails 
specific predicates. My argument thus is that reference is common between Muslims and 
Christians while worship is not. 
Setting the Scene 
Prior to establishing these arguments, I need to highlight three theories for 
developing a response to whether Muslims and Christians refer to and subsequently 
worship the same God. By locating my project in terms of philosophy of language, my 
line of argumentation grapples with the particularities of what establishes reference. In a 
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sense, these theories provide the backdrop from which my argument emerges. Thus a 
proper understanding of each is a vital preliminary step for making sense of my claim.  
The first of these theories is called the descriptive theory of reference (DTR), also 
known as descriptivism. Epitomized in Donnellan’s analysis, the theory follows as:1  
 
a n refers to an e when said by a s if and only if the descriptive content associated 
with the n applies exclusively to e and only e for the s.2  
 
In less deductive terms, reference by description holds between a proper name and an 
entity when the entity satisfies the descriptive content associated with the proper name. 
For instance, upon use of Nikola Jokic, the proper name intends to refer to the individual 
that satisfies “the 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft.” That is, reference holds 
between the proper name and the individual if and only if Nikola Jokic is the individual 
that satisfies the description (i.e., the 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft). A rather 
simple example, DTR is often more complex since entities are usually associated with 
various descriptions. For example, it is not unlikely that predicates other than “the 41st 
overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft” will be associated with Nikola Jokic (e.g., large, 
Serb). In situations where multiple descriptions are associated with an e, the n refers to 
 
1. For other construal’s of the descriptive theory of reference, see Bertrand Russell, “On 
Denoting,” Mind 114:873–87; Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1989). 
2. Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions” 265–77. I adapted this version from Meghan 
Sullivan’s construal of the theory. See Sullivan, “Semantics for Blasphemy,” 159–72. 
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whatever e that satisfies all, most, or the more important of the possible descriptions. In 
this sense, DTR holds between descriptive content and entities.3 
 An alternate theory to DTR, the second theory establishes reference by 
testimonial exchange rather than by description. Developed by Kripke, the causal-
historical theory of reference (CHTR) operates in the following way: 
 
a n refers to e when said by a s if and only if either (1) s “baptized” e with n or (2) 
s was told by another member of the testimonial chain that n stands for e and thus 
uses n with the intent to refer to e.4 
 
For routes (1) and (2), the basic phenomenon is that an e is associated with a n in order 
that members along the testimonial chain will be able to refer to e. Beginning with route 
(1), Kripke believes that an e can acquire a n when a s has a unique perceptible 
experience (i.e., baptismal moment) of the e in such a way that s names the e. Once this 
initial perceptible experience has occurred, it is then passed from member to member 
along the testimonial chain as illustrated in (2). Kripke’s theory thus is a cooperative 
exchange between members of a community that consistently invoke the initial 
perceptible experience of the e by the original s with the use of the n.5  
 
3. Donnellan’s construal of DTR is important in light of several of its unique contributions. One 
such contribution made by Donnellan is that a name can still refer to an entity regardless of whether the 
description(s) are indictive of the entity. For more on this point, read the famous example of the man 
holding the martini glass. See Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions” 265–77. 
4. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 80–86. See also Sullivan, “Semantics for Blasphemy,” 159–72. 
5. If the causal-historical theory of reference (CHTR) seems far-fetched, given that information is 
transmitted by testimonial exchange, read Kripke, Naming and Necessity. Also see Benjamin McMyler, 
Testimony, Trust, and Authority (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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 Kripke develops this theory in opposition to DTR because he determines that 
descriptivism is unable to account for irregularities common among referential relations. 
To illustrate DTR’s inability to account for these irregularities, Kripke develops an 
objection called Gödel-Schmidt. The objection goes as follows: 
 
Kurt Friedrich Gödel is associated with the predicate “proved mathematical 
theorem x.” Gödel, however, was not the founder of the theorem given that he 
stole the theorem from a person by the name of Schmidt. Subsequently, he took 
exclusive credit for the theorem. Thus when “proved mathematical theorem x” is 
predicated of Gödel, there is a propensity to say (in light of DTR) that Gödel 
“proved mathematical theorem x.” This, however, is false because Gödel did not 
prove the theorem but rather stole it from Schmidt.6 
 
About this objection, Kripke argues that DTR can refer only to one of two things. Either 
the predicate “proved mathematical theorem x” refers to Gödel (the thief) or it refers to 
nobody at all. It cannot refer to the individual that proved the theorem if, under the 
pretense of Gödel-Schmidt, there is no adequate reason to link Schmidt with the predicate 
“proved mathematical theorem x.” As long as Schmidt remains in obscurity, there is 
insufficient reason to link or pair him with theorem x in light of DTR. Therefore, 
according to Kripke, Schmidt is left in obscurity and false claims are propagated about 
Gödel under DTR. 
 
6. The Gödel-Schmidt objection is adapted from Kripke. For the full version of the objection, see 
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 83–4. 
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 Lastly, an alternate theory to DTR and CHTR is often called the hybrid theory of 
reference (HTR), which was developed by Evans.7 Under this theory of reference, a 
proper name is causally-historically handed from member to member much like CHTR 
but does not exclude descriptive content (i.e., DTR) when assessing referential relations. 
In this sense, s attributes n to an e during her initial and unique perceptible experience 
while also perceiving and thus attaching a catalogue of information (i.e., dossier) to the e. 
When the s says (or thinks) the n, it not only draws attention to the e, but it also 
accentuates the descriptive content attached to the e during her perceptible experience.8  
 In the situation when the n is handed off to another member of the community, the 
s is not responsible for indicating the e that n refers to but rather which proper name she 
intends to use. Without indicating the correct n, the s is incapable of saying anything 
about the proper e. Simply predicating p of e is does not specify which entity s intends to 
reference. As illustrated in the example of Volf, simply saying that “something” is p does 
not determine anything positive about that “something.” A better way forward, according 
to Evans, is for the s to confirm the proper name she intends to use by corroborating the 
proper name with its causal-historical chain and the descriptive content associate with it. 
The argument here is that to refer to e, the s must confirm which proper name is 
connected to e by corroborating it with its causal-historical account and the descriptive 
content gained during s’s initial and unique perceptible experience. 
 
7. For an initial notion see Gareth Evans, “Causal Theory of Names,” 314–25 and for a more 
robust notion look at Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982), 373–404. It should be noted that Evans never finished the latter of these works. 
8. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 394–95. 
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As an alternate theory, Evens has reason for why DTR and CHTR are inadequate 
for accounting for reference. To highlight these inadequacies, Evans agrees with Kripke’s 
Gödel-Schmidt objection but disputes how CHTR does any better at accounting for the 
irregularities common among referential relations. To articulate his dispute, Evans 
develops an objection to CHTR by the title of Drifting Turnip. Evans outlines his 
objection in the following way: 
 
Young boy A by the name of Turnip leaves his small village to find his fortunes. 
Many years later, a man B comes to the village to live as a hermit. Upon his 
arrival, several of the original villagers believe that B is A who departed the 
village years prior. The original villagers thus begin to say things such as, “Turnip 
is coming to get coffee” or “Turnip lives over the hill.” These mistaken claims 
make their way into circulation among the younger set of villagers. Once the 
original villagers die off, the younger villagers will, in light of CHTR, use Turnip 
to refer to B rather than A.9  
 
As with this objection, CHTR is unable to account for drift (or change) in reference. 
Since proper names (e.g., Turnip) are transmitted from member to member in a causal-
historical chain, it is not unlikely that reference can be altered in way that the name no 
longer refers to the original entity. As exemplified in Drifting Turnip, false inferences are 
made by the original villagers that results in the mistake between A and B. So misleading 
 
9. The objection of Drifting Turnip is adapted from Evans. For the full version of the objection, 
see Evans, “Causal Theory of Names,” 206–7. 
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are these inferences, the original villagers mistake (over time) a young fortune seeker 
with an old religious recluse. Much like the Gödel-Schmidt objection, Turnip can refer 
either to B or to nobody at all. The proper name cannot refer to A (the correct individual) 
given that the cluster of information associated with B (i.e., young fortune seeker) has 
been altered with predicates like “lives over the hill” and “is a hermit.”  
Beside including the combined strengths of DTR and CHTR, the importance of 
HTR is that it considers the appropriate information for establishing reference. According 
to Evans, descriptive content (in light of causal-historical chain) establishes reference not 
by descriptive fit but by what is most dominant in the body of information about an 
entity.10 Though Evans argues that dominance often pinpoints something particular in an 
entity’s dossier, he also leaves open the possibility that informational spread can be 
dominant. As he says, “Dominance is not simply a function of amount of information” 
though “detail in a particular area can be outweighed by [informational] spread” (original 
emphasis).11 I take this to mean that, in the example of Nikola Jokic, “the 41st overall 
pick in the 2014 NBA draft” is not always more dominant than predicative spread that 
includes descriptions such as “tall,” “large,” and “European.” 
 Thus with respect to the forthcoming argument, I presume predicative spread is 
generally most dominant during the referential use of proper names. Though there are 
 
10. Evans, “Causal Theory of Names,” 201. 
11. Evans, “Causal Theory of Names,” 201. To further comment on this quotation, Evans’s theory 
is primarily concerned with what is most central within an entity’s dossier. That is why Evans rules out 
descriptive fit in exchange for what is truly dominant in the dossier of an entity. He argues thus for 
descriptive dominance over descriptive fit; however, he does not rule out what he calls informational 
spread. Thus I am offering fair warning that descriptive fit should not be mistaken for information spread.  
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bound to be exceptions to this rule, as my upcoming argument illustrates, proper names in 
everyday use tend to refer with respect to what is neither irreducible nor unique of an 
entity. In other words, proper names are inclined to refer to their intended entity (in light 
of a causal-historical account) because they are connected to descriptive content that does 
not pinpoint something particular in an entity.  
A Common God in Reference  
At this point I believe HTR is a more substantive theory of reference because it 
maintains the strengths of DTR and CHTR. By utilizing a causal-historical exchange and 
descriptive content, HTR appeals to a wider deposit of evidence for establishing 
reference. As such, HTR bypasses the objections of Gödel-Schmidt and Drifting Turnip 
because DTR and CHTR facilitate each other by appealing to different facets for what 
establishes reference.  
To illustrate just how HTR bypasses the objections of Gödel-Schmidt and 
Drifting Turnip, take once again how DTR and CHTR are occasionally unable to 
establish reference. As seen in the Gödel-Schmidt objection, DTR has an inability to link 
Schmidt with “proved mathematical theorem x.” DTR either references the incorrect 
individual or no individual at all. It cannot, in any justifiable capacity, refer to Schmidt 
(i.e., the correct individual) because he has no causal-historical connection to the 
theorem. Likewise, CHTR is also unable to refer to young boy A since it appeals to a 
causal-historical exchange. As the objection of Drifting Turnip illustrates, a causal-
historical exchange either, under these circumstances, refers to the incorrect individual or 
no individual at all. It too cannot refer to the correct individual (i.e., A) because the 
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original villagers cannot verify B’s ontological character without assessing the cluster of 
information associate with B. 
By contrast, HTR mends these incongruences by incorporating the strengths of 
DTR and CHTR. This permits Schmidt and young boy A to be properly referenced. For 
instance, if there had been a causal-historical connection between Schmidt and “proved 
mathematical theorem x,” then it is unlikely that Gödel could have acquired unscrupulous 
credit for the theorem. If the name Schmidt invoked “proved mathematical theorem x” or 
“proven mathematical theorem x” invoked Schmidt and either one were linked with a 
causal-historical chain, it is unlikely that Gödel could have acquired accreditation for the 
theorem. Likewise in Drifting Turnip, if descriptive content had been connected to the 
causal-historical exchange, it is improbable A would be mistake for B. If descriptions 
such as “lives in the city” and “does not like coffee” had been added to the preexisting 
causal-historical exchange, it is improbable that A would have been mistaken for B.  
In either Gödel-Schmidt or Drifting Turnip, HTR is a better theory when 
establishing reference. This is confirmed by Bogardus and Urban, who believe that the 
combined benefit of DTR and CHTR is favored when deciding whether Muslims and 
Christians worship the same God.12 They argue that combining a causal-historical 
exchange with descriptive content not only establishes reference, but it also considers 
how reference drifts over time. They believe the ways in which HTR accounts for 
reference and referential drift plays a fundamental role when judging whether Muslims 
 
12. I think it is reasonable to note that others, including Meghan Sullivan, find HTR to be the most 
well-rounded theory of reference. This is to say, I think there has been plenty of thought done on HTR that 
attributes to its legitimacy.  
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and Christians worship the same God.13 To make this argument, Bogardus and Urban 
introduce an example that, according to HTR, illustrates what is entailed in deciding 
whether Muslims and Christians refer to and also worship the same God. This example I 
call Saint or Claus: 
 
Saint Nicholas and Santa Claus corefer to the same individual associated with 
predicates like “3rd and 4th century Christian saint,” “born in Myra,” and 
“celebrated for his anonymous gift giving.” Over time, however, the cluster of 
information attached to Santa Claus begins to be associated with predicates like 
“white bearded man,” “Nordic elf,” and “delivers gifts on Christmas.” In this 
sense, Santa Claus undergoes referential drift in such a way that it becomes 
ambiguous whether Santa Claus refers to the same entity associated with the 
individual with the predicative phrase “Christian saint born in Myra.” In light of 
referential drift, the question becomes whether Saint Nicholas and Santa Claus 
corefer to the same individual after the original cluster of information has been 
altered.14 
 
13. Bogardus and Urban (including others and I) assume that reference is a prerequisite for 
worship. That is, it cannot be established that Muslims and Christians worship the same God without first 
establishing that they refer to the same God. As Bogardus and Urban put it, “We assume that . . . Muslims 
and Christians worship the same God only if they refer to the same God.” The sequence thus for developing 
a response to whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God is that it must first be established that 
they refer to the same God. For more on this point, see Bogardus and Urban, “How to Tell” and Jeroen 
Ridder and René Woudenberg, “Referring to, Believing in, and Worshiping the Same God,” Faith and 
Philosophy 31 (2014): 46–67. 
14. The example of Saint or Claus is adapted from Bogardus and Urban. For the full articulation of 
example, see Bogardus and Urban, “How to Tell,” 185–94. Moreover, you can also find another 
articulation of the example of Saint or Claus in Jerry Walls, “None Worship the Same God: A Different 
Conception View,” in Do Christians, Muslims, and Jews Worship the Same God?: Four Views, ed. Ronnie 
Campbell and Christopher Gnanakan (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academics, 2019), 160–81. 
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 Much like other examples in previous sections, Saint or Claus portrays an 
individual that is associated with descriptive content and is named. However, over time 
the body of descriptive content associated with the individual begins to be altered with 
the incorporation of different predicates. In the example, Santa Claus is originally 
associated with “Christian saint born in Myra.” But over time, Santa Claus begins to be 
associated with “Nordic elf who delivers gifts on Christmas.” In light of these alternate 
predicates, the question becomes whether Santa Claus refers to the same individual as 
Saint Nicholas or whether reference has been bifurcated. Toward these considerations, 
Bogardus and Urban argue that HTR positions us in a way that informs our judgment on 
such questions. 
More importantly, Bogardus and Urban make the point that Saint or Claus 
illustrates what is entailed in whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. In 
relation to the previous point, they argue that HTR positions us to decide whether 
Muslims and Christians worship the same God given that it resembles the example of 
Saint or Claus. For instance, in the same way that Saint Nicholas and Santa Claus are 
originally associated with “Christian saint born in Myra,” Bogardus and Urban argue that 
the Islamic and Christian conceptions of God originated from the same referent.15 They 
believe that Islam and Christianity, largely drawn from the Abrahamic tradition,  
maintain that God is an “omniscient, omnipotent creator, who spoke to Abraham.” With 
 
15. Notice the language I am using here. Though not evident in the article of Bogardus and Urban, 
I think it is safe to say that the Islamic and Christian conceptions of God evolved over an extended period 
of time. I think it is a more logical sequence that Muslims and Christians originally conceived of God in 
terms of the Abrahamic tradition. But, over time, it is likely that Muslims and Christians began to interpret 
God’s activities in terms of their own particular experiences. It is in light of this evolutionary sequence that 
I think we get theologies such as Tawhid and Trinity that are particular to their own traditions. 
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time, however, either the Islamic, Christian, or both their understandings of God began to 
incorporate alternate predicates. This, of course, jeopardizes reference by increasing the 
chances of referential drift. 
As the title of their work indicates (i.e., “How to Tell Whether Christians and 
Muslims Worship the Same God”), Bogardus and Urban do not establish whether they 
believe Muslims and Christians refer to and possibly worship the same God. Their article 
exclusively establishes the conditions under which reference drifts and how we might 
decide whether this has happened in the situation of Muslims and Christians. In this way, 
Bogardus and Urban should not be understood as making normative claims on whether 
Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Bogardus and Urban simply establish the 
conditions under which reference and referential drift occur. 
To ensure clarity of thought, however, Bogardus and Urban do not believe that 
Saint Nicholas and Santa Claus corefer to the same entity as they once did.16 Given the 
contemporary associations with Santa Claus (e.g., Nordic elf who delivers gifts on 
Christmas), they argue that the predicative discrepancies between Saint Nicholas and 
Santa Claus are too significant for coreference. According to them, Santa Claus in the 
minds of contemporary children and parents almost exclusively refers to the individual 
associated with “Nordic elf who delivers gifts on Christmas.” This is so much so that 
Santa Claus cannot possibly refer to the individual associated with “Christian saint born 
in Myra.” Thus Bogardus and Urban argue that the cluster of information associated with 
Santa Claus has been altered to such an extent that the name cannot refer to Saint 
Nicholas. 
 
16. Bogardus and Urban, “How to Tell,” 192. 
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Application of Bogardus and Urban 
In relation to Bogardus and Urban, several have developed responses on whether 
Muslims and Christians worship the same God.17 One such and particularly important 
response for this thesis is developed by Jerry Walls. In conjunction with Bogardus and 
Urban, Walls makes the argument that Muslims have so “radically” altered the 
information associated with God that they no longer refer to God. He says,  
 
As someone who thinks Christianity is true, I am inclined to think there has in fact 
been a reference shift in the case of Islam but not Christianity. That is, the dossier 
for ‘Allah’ includes claims that are so radically at odds with core Christian truth 
claims that a reference shift has occurred such that ‘Allah’ does not refer to God. 
Since Christians and Muslims do not even refer to the same God, they do not 
worship the same God.18 
  
Much like Bogardus and Urban do with Saint or Claus, Walls mimics their reasoning as it 
relates to the question at hand. In the same way that Saint Nicholas and Santa Claus 
originally referenced the same entity, Walls argues that God in the minds of Muslims and 
 
17. Though Walls is not the only philosopher or theologian utilizing Bogardus and Urban, some 
have critique their article. For example, see Francis J. Beckwith, “All Worship the same God: Referring to 
the same God View,” in Do Christians, Muslims, and Jews Worship the Same God?: Four Views, ed. 
Ronnie Campbell and Christopher Gnanakan (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academics, 2019), 66–86. 
18. Walls, “None Worship the Same God,” 167. 
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Christians did the same thing.19 However, much in the same way that Santa Claus 
underwent referential drift (i.e., from historical to fictional figure), Allah underwent the 
same sort of change. Under this analysis, upon use of Allah by Muslims, the proper name 
does not refer to the God attested in the Abrahamic tradition; rather, it refers to some 
fictional reality.20 
 The underscore of his delimitation is that the Trinity (and subsequently the 
incarnation) is primary in the life of God.21 His claim is that the God of the Abrahamic 
tradition is Triune and thus any claim about God that is not regarded as such cannot 
conceivably refer to the entity perceived by Abraham. Walls says, The Abrahamic God 
“is the Trinitarian God . . . [and consequently], no alleged revelation that denies that 
Jesus is the eternal Son of God, such as the Qur’an, could be revelation from God.”22 His 
argument thus is that Muslims have altered their conception of Allah away from the 
Abrahamic tradition and have embraced an Islamic conception of monotheism (i.e., 
Tawhid); therefore, they no longer refer to God as Christians in fact do.23  
 To locate Walls in the current thesis, recall from the previous chapter what I 
labeled as generic and specific predicates. Walls appears to think that reference and 
 
19. To ensure clarity, the reader must not confuse Allah as being an alternative name for God. 
Rather Allah translates to God from the Arabic. Moreover, it is firmly held within scholarship that 
etymologically Allah and God trace back to Judeo-Christian roots. 
20. Walls, “None Worship the Same God,” 166. 
21. I assume Walls would say on the flip side that Tawhid constitutes the most dominant 
information in God’s dossier for Muslims. Though he never explicitly says that, I think for the sake of 
maintaining consistency, he would make this claim. 
22. Walls, “None Worship the Same God,” 165. 
23. Notice the title of Walls chapter (i.e., “None Worship the Same God”). Not only does Walls 
argument apply to Muslims, but also to Jews. As he says, “I shall take the negative answer [that all three do 
not worship the same God] because I think it is true.” See Walls, “None Worship the Same God,” 160–61. 
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referential drift rely primarily (if not exclusively) upon specific predicates in light of a 
causal-historical exchange. Namely, only predicates that are irreducible and unique of an 
entity (e.g., Nichola Jokic is 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft) account for 
reference and referential drift. When it comes to the question at hand, he relies on 
specific predicative phases such as “God is Triune” rather than what I call generic 
predicates (e.g., goodness, love). His argument thus tracks nicely with Bogardus and 
Urban and their explanation of HTR, given that they argue that dominance pinpoints 
something particular about an entity. In the same way that Santa Claus does not corefer 
with Saint Nicholas, Walls argues that Allah no longer refers to the God of the 
Abrahamic tradition because Muslims deny God as Triune. For Walls, the outcome of 
their denial proves that reference has drifted in a way where Muslims and Christians no 
longer refer to much less worship, the same God. 
 His line of argumentation is important because it frames the way in which I 
develop my argument in the immediate pages. Though I agree neither with his conception 
of dominance nor his overall conclusion on the question, he nevertheless illustrates how 
one can use HTR to decide whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. In 
accord with Walls, the fact that HTR can assist our decision on Saint or Claus is enough 
reason to use the theory for the current question. My argument thus uses HTR much in 
the same as Walls; however, by focusing on the connection between proper names and 
descriptive content, my argument diverges and even challenges Walls’ analysis. 
Argument 1: Common God in Reference 
 What I have articulated so far is that HTR positions us to decide whether Muslims 
and Christians worship the same God since the theory bypasses the objections of Gödel-
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Schmidt and Drifting Turnip. This is epitomized in Saint or Claus where HTR accounts 
for reference and referential drift. Because I seek to argue that Muslims and Christians 
refer to but do not worship the same God, the logical sequence of my argument is to 
establish the conditions of reference before undertaking those related to worship.24 All of 
this depends, of course, upon the legitimacy of HTR and its ability to determine whether 
a proper name refers to its intended entity. Given that I think the HTR is legitimate for 
my purposes, I attempt to determine whether Muslims and Christians meet the 
appropriate conditions to refer to the same God. 
Of course, any attempt to establish that Muslims and Christians refer to the same 
God requires that they meet two conditions, according to HTR. The first is that Muslims 
and Christians must share a causal-historical account that originates from the same initial 
and unique perceptible experience. The second is that Muslims and Christians must agree 
upon a dominant body of information about God. For any reason that either of these 
cannot be agreed upon, reference and subsequently worship cannot be established 
between Muslims and Christians. Thus any claim maintaining that Muslims and 
Christians refer to the same God must validate that Muslims and Christians share both 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
24. Once again, my project assumes that reference precedes worship. That is, we must first be able 
to refer to an entity before we could ever worship that entity. Though several have supported this claim 
(including Walls, Bogardus, and Urban), there are great philosophical challenges associated with this 
inference. I do not have space or time to take up these philosophical challenges. But it is important to note 
that I am assuming that reference precedes worship. See Walls, “None Worship the Same God,” 161. 
 
 
 
52 
The First Condition of HTR 
To begin with the first, it is nearly univocal in current research that Muslims and 
Christians share a causal-historical account that traces back to the Abrahamic tradition.25 
As Bogardus and Urban put it, “[T]here is no doubt that the use of Allah by Muslims 
traces back to . . . the divine-name-using practice of Jews and Christians.”26 Primarily a 
historical question (e.g., etymology, historical theology), there is sufficient evidence that 
Allah when used by Muslims is primarily prompted by Jewish thought that permeated the 
Gulf region through the infusion of Christianity. Thus Islam inherited Allah from the 
same etymological origins as Christianity, which has links with the Abrahamic tradition. 
This is an essential point because it demonstrates that God in the mouth of Muslims and 
Christians springs from the same name-calling practice and not from “two distinct 
practices involving the use of the [same] name.”27 Though this is an important research 
topic that deserves greater attention, given the parameters of this thesis are primarily 
philosophical, I do not have adequate space to deal with the historicity of this question. 
However, I think it is safe to rely on the scholarly input on this point provided that the 
research is nearly univocal with few outliers; thus there is adequate evidence that 
Muslims and Christians share the same causal-historical chain. 
 This univocity is significant because it points to the fact that Muslims and 
Christians share at least one of two conditions that determine common reference. 
However, the question still remains whether Muslims and Christians share a dominant 
 
25. For more on this point, see Bogardus and Urban, “How to Tell,” 192. 
26. Bogardus and Urban, “How to Tell,” 192. 
27. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 380–82. 
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cluster of information about God. In recent research, whether Muslims and Christians 
share a body of information about God that qualifies as dominant has been the primary 
dispute among philosophers and theologians. As illustrated earlier, there are several 
different and conflicting expositions on this point (e.g., Volf, Turner, George). In light of 
this variety and conflict, I devote the remainder of this section to argue that Muslims and 
Christians agree upon the second condition of reference. 
The Second Condition of HTR 
As outlined in Evans, once a proper name has been associated with descriptive 
content, that content is accentuated whenever the name is used by those in the name-
calling practice. He demonstrates this with a simple example: “[E]veryone who is 
introduced to the [name-calling practice of] ‘Robin Hood’ learns more or less the 
legend.”28 Once people have been properly integrated into a name-calling practice (e.g., 
Robin Hood), the original descriptive content attached to the name (e.g., “bandit,” “uses a 
longbow”) is elucidated in the minds of members of the community whenever the name 
is used. This original descriptive content is unlikely to change in the name-calling 
practice because it eventually becomes “common knowledge between members of the 
practice.”29 Once the original descriptive content has become common knowledge among 
members of the community, it should adjust only when new information is added since 
the community’s identity is built on what is common among all members.30 
 
28. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 394. 
29. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 394–95. 
30. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 394–95. 
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Evans’ point illustrates the innate quality of proper names to elucidate descriptive 
content. However, this does not specify how exactly proper names do so. Even within 
Evans’ theory of reference, it is unclear how a proper name such as Robin Hood 
elucidates a predicative phrase such as “a bandit who robs the rich to feed the poor.” 
Thus even within a robust exposition such as HTR, the question still remains: how do 
proper names, from the perspective of philosophy of language, elucidate descriptive 
content upon use? From an intuitive perspective, proper names elucidate descriptive 
content according to the previous example. However, intuition is not a robust analysis of 
proper names and their ability to elucidate descriptive content for assessing whether 
Muslims and Christians meet the second condition of reference. 
Thus to explain how proper names accentuate descriptive content, take Searle and 
his explication of this dynamic.31 As a preliminary step for his explanation, Searle asks 
how proper names refer to entities and how this differs from reference by definite 
descriptions and demonstratives. That is, what unique linguistic mechanisms do proper 
names maintain that permits them to refer to entities, and how do they differ from 
singular expression like definite descriptions or demonstratives?32 On the one hand, 
unlike proper names, definite descriptions refer because they are typically said about an 
entity.33 For instance, “The 43rd president of United States” refers to the entity that 
satisfies the description: the individual represented by George W. Bush. On the other 
 
31. Searle, “Proper Names,” 166–73. 
32. Searle, “Proper Names,” 170. 
33. This dynamic is often called the Frege-Russell view given that Gottlob Frege and Bertrand 
Russell used the idea of sense and descriptive content to make this connection between words and thoughts 
with entities. 
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hand, demonstratives secure reference by specific contextual conditions that have been 
linked or paired with utterances such as “This is . . .” For example, when George W. 
Bush stands in the South Lawn prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, he can be referenced 
by saying, “This is George W. Bush.” 
The referential use of proper names, however, is not as clear cut as it is with 
definite descriptions and demonstratives. Even within a robust theory of reference like 
HTR, it is not clear what within a proper name generates reference. Certainly the 
combination of a causal-historical chain and descriptive content verifies the proper name 
in use. But HTR does not qualify what linguistic mechanism within in a proper name 
generates reference. In light of such obscurity, Searle investigates the referential use of 
proper names to uncover what in them is generating reference. 
To begin, Searle launches his inquiry on whether proper names elucidate 
descriptive content with the following proposition: Suppose, for instance, that members 
of the name-calling practice of George W. Bush are asked to list a set of characteristics 
about the individual represented by the name. In such a situation, members of the name-
calling practice would list descriptive content that intends to “uniquely” refer to George 
W. Bush.34 That is because George W. Bush has been previously associated with 
descriptive content that inevitably connects the name to a particular individual. When 
asked, members of the name-calling practice would elucidate a “sufficient but so far 
unspecific” set of characteristics that intend to refer to George W. Bush.35 Thus the 
 
34. Searle, “Proper Names,” 171. 
35. Searle, “Proper Names,” 171. 
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assumption here is that the referential use of proper names presupposes the existence of 
entities that satisfy a list of characteristics. 
However, the primary difficulty when using the referential use of proper names is 
assessing what kind of descriptive content establishes the second condition of reference. 
That is, the imprecision that accompanies the referential use of proper names creates 
difficulties when judging whether a set of predicates sufficiently establishes the second 
condition of reference. The question thus looms as to what in a proper name elucidates 
descriptive content and how does that establish reference. 
To clarify what in a proper name contains descriptive content, Searle makes a 
distinction between the referential functions of descriptivism and proper names with the 
following proposition:36 Suppose, for example, George W. Bush came to be associated 
with a detailed and exhaustive set of descriptions. For example, George W. Bush is 
associated with a precise set of predicates such as ‘p1, p2 . . . pn’ where pn is a finite 
number of predicates. In such instances, when George W. Bush is used, reference would 
be achieved by corroborating predicates ‘p1, p2 . . . pn’ with the individual represented by 
his name. George W. Bush in this sense would be associated with such a precise and rigid 
set of characteristics that it could refer only at the expense of being corroborated with the 
individual that satisfies predicates ‘p1, p2 . . . pn.’ In instances that the individual 
represented by George W. Bush and predicates ‘p1, p2 . . . pn’ could not be corroborated, 
reference is unlikely to occur. Therefore, under such parameters, a proper name that has 
been associated with a detailed and exhaustive set of predicates cannot refer to an entity 
that does not satisfy those characteristics. 
 
36. Searle, “Proper Names,” 171. 
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However, as a result of the association between George W. Bush and a detailed 
and exhaustive set of predicates, the name appears to be an unnecessary criterion of 
reference. If the proper name refers only because it is associated with a precise and rigid 
set of predicates, the name serves little to no purpose for establishing reference other than 
being a shorthand for elucidating predicates ‘p1, p2 . . . pn.’ As said by Searle, “the name 
itself would become superfluous for it would become logically equivalent to this set of 
descriptions.”37 Since George W. Bush is associated with a rigid and precise set of 
predicates, the name is doing nothing unique apart from a describing function. The 
consequence of this is that George W. Bush functions basically in the same way as 
predicates ‘p1, p2 . . . pn,’ which makes the name a superfluous criterion. Under this 
misguided conception, the referential functions of descriptivism and proper names have 
been conflated in such a way that proper names do not have a unique referential function.  
Proper names, however, almost never operate in such a precise and rigid way as 
depicted above. Rather, in Searle’s mind, proper names allow an entity to be referenced 
without elucidating a detailed and exhaustive set of characteristics (i.e., specific 
predicates). He says, “the convenience of proper names [lies] precisely in the fact that 
they enable us to refer publicly to objects without [coming to] agreement on what 
[characteristics] exactly constitute the identity of the object.”38 Proper names in this way 
do not function by descriptive exactitudes, but rather they refer because they elucidate a 
sufficient and yet unspecific set of predicates held true about entities.39 This means, for 
 
37. Searle, “Proper Names,” 171. 
38. Searle, “Proper Names,” 172. 
39. Searle, “Proper Names,” 173. 
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instance, that even predicates like “the former governor of Texas” or “the son of George 
H. W. Bush” (or some combination of these) are likely to refer to George W. Bush. 
Proper names thus refer because they are logically connected to a set of predicates that 
are not precise in terms of either extent or quality (i.e., generic predicates). 
To clarify further, Searle goes on to describe the referential function of proper 
names in terms of categorical “looseness.”40 Instead of indicating the exactitudes of an 
entity’s ontological character, proper names accentuate an entity’s ontology “in a loose 
sort of way.”41 When, for example, members of the name-calling practice assert George 
W. Bush, the name is bound to elucidate a set of characteristics. It is unlikely, however, 
that those characteristics will be detailed and exhaustive. Given the way in which proper 
names function in their everyday use, predicates such as “the former governor of Texas” 
or “the son of George H. W. Bush” are more likely to be elucidated than predicates such 
as “the 46th governor of Texas” or “the 43rd president of the United States.” In this way, 
proper names do not elucidate in accord to specific predication but rather allude by 
generic predication.  
With this distinction, Searle has managed to separate the referential functions of 
descriptivism and proper names. Provided that proper names elucidate descriptive content 
in a less detailed and exhaustive way than descriptivism, Searle has illustrated the 
difference between their functions; namely, that definite descriptions refer by indicating 
“what an object is” while proper names refer without ever taking “issue [with] what an 
 
40. Searle, “Proper Names,” 173. 
41. Searle, “Proper Names,” 173. 
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object is.”42 As such, the difference between the referential functions of descriptivism and 
proper names is primarily ontological. In terms of descriptivism, the function “refers in 
virtue of the fact that the [descriptive content]” is linked or paired to an entity in a precise 
and exhaustive manner. Unlike descriptivism, proper names refer because they accentuate 
descriptive content in an unconditional or “loose” way. 
This means that if a proper name is used and its referent is not self-evident, the 
proper name can be qualified by the descriptive content elucidated during the name’s use. 
For instance, when Robin Hood is asserted, the name should refer to the “heroic outlaw 
in English folklore” for every person integrated into the name-calling practice. Yet at any 
point that there is confusion or dispute about what individual is being referenced, the 
individual can be qualified by the generic predicates elucidated during the name’s use. If 
members of the name-calling practice elucidate the generic predicates such as “has a 
bow,” “robs the rich,” and “feeds the poor,” then it can be assumed there is coreference 
among members. However, if members of the name-calling practice accentuate radically 
different predicates among one another, reference has apparently drifted. 
This has obvious importance for the question at hand because it clarifies the 
second condition of reference. Given that there is confusion and dispute on whether 
Muslims and Christians refer to the same God, the generic predicates accentuated during 
the name’s use should clarify, according to Searle, whether they meet the second 
condition of reference. Because they share the same name-calling practice in situations 
where they elucidate generic predicates like love, good, omnipotent, and omnipresent, 
then there is adequate evidence that they refer to the same God. However, in the situation 
 
42. Searle, “Proper Names,” 172. 
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wherethey do not elucidate similar generic predicates, it is unlikely that they refer to the 
same God. 
Before I consider whether Muslims and Christians meet the second condition, let 
us recapitulate what has been said thus far in two basic premises. The first is that proper 
names presuppose the existence of entities that they intend to reference. Only in rare 
situations are proper names used in ways that do not intend to refer to entities.43 It is 
intuitive from this that when a proper name is used, it intends to refer to a specific entity 
and not some fictional reality.44 The second and subsidiary of the first is that proper 
names are almost always associated with descriptive content in a generic or loose way. In 
the situation that proper names are not associated with descriptive content, then there is 
no way to confirm that a proper name refers to the appropriate entity. That said, if the 
former is acceptable, the latter is necessitated given that there must be a way for the 
former to be confirmed. Otherwise, the basic structure of language ceases to operate and 
the way in which the referential function of proper names (e.g., Nikola Jokic, George W. 
Bush) and names in general (e.g., lodgepole pine, lark bunting) work is illegitimate.  
Similar Set of Generic Predicates 
If these premises are satisfactory, then developing a response to whether Muslims 
and Christians meet the second condition of reference depends on whether they elucidate 
(at least) a similar set of generic predicates that, in Searle’s language, are loose in their 
original sense. Though I presume there are several ways to determine the kinds of 
 
43. One such way would be deception. Someone might want to trick a person into believing that 
there is a person with a particular name when really there is no such person. 
44. Notice the word “intend.” Whether the use of a proper name actually refers is beside the point. 
All that matters is that proper names almost always “intend” to refer to specific entities regardless if they 
are successful doing so. 
 
 
 
61 
predicates Muslims and Christians accentuate upon the use of God, one such way is to 
consider systematic theology, of which, predicates are ubiquitous. Theological claims, of 
course, cannot be made without some commitment to the divine predicates (or attributes). 
Statements such as “God is . . .” or “God, you are . . .” all presuppose, in various degrees, 
an obligation to divine predication.45 In light of this inference, it appears reasonable that 
systematic theology for Islam and Christianity can illuminate the divine predicates 
common among Muslims and Christians. My presumption thus is that systematic 
theology can position us to determine whether Muslims and Christians accentuate the 
same or at least a similar set of generic predicates that meet the second condition of 
reference. 
For those familiar with systematic theology, it is obvious that a thesis such as the 
current one is unable to provide a comprehensive outline and explanation of the divine 
predicates upheld in Islam and Christianity, the mere scope and intricacy of which is well 
beyond the capacity and applicability of this thesis. Regardless, if systematic theology for 
Islam and Christianity were explained, it would be understood that Muslims and 
Christians share (at least in a loose kind of way) a common set of generic predicates. To 
support this inference, take how the predicate of love is attested in Islam and Christianity. 
The Christian tradition, on the one hand, not only maintains that “love is from God” but 
more specifically that “God is love” (1 John 4:7–8, 16). It is out of this love that creation 
“might live through” God (1 John 4:9). On the other hand, the Islamic tradition in a 
 
45. Stephen R. Holmes, “The Attributes of God,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic 
Theology, ed. John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (New York: University of Oxford, 2007), 
54–71.  
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similar way affirms that God is “the Most Loving,” from which, God “originates” and 
thus sustains “the created order” (Al-Buruj 11–12).46  
Moreover, later Islamic and Christian traditions expound upon what it means for 
God to maintain love within the life of God. Pseudo-Dionysius, for example, connects 
God’s love with God’s provisional care for the created order (i.e., providence). He says, 
“[T]hey call him . . . love because he is the power moving and lifting all things up to 
himself.”47 In other words, it is God’s love that provides for and sustains all created 
things that ultimately prompts them to achieve their proper ends. Likewise, Al-Ghazālī 
makes a connection between divine love and God’s mercy and favor bestowed upon 
creation (i.e., providence). He says, “[T]he Loving-Kind is the one who wishes all 
creatures well and accordingly favors them.”48 Much like the Pseudo-Dionysius, Al-
Ghazālī maintains that God’s love underpins creation’s ability to thrive in accord with 
God’s mercy and favor. Thus from a scriptural and theological perspective, God’s love 
implicates provisional care for creation in Islam and Christianity. 
Muslims and Christians thus agree at the very least that there is some positive 
element in the life of God that is analogous to the human emotive capacity of love. Their 
understandings of love illustrate the reciprocal conception that God is love and, out of 
love, God provides for creation. It seems sensible thus to conclude from these inferences 
 
46. Note that the Most Loving is one of ninety-nine beautiful names (or predicates) of God upheld 
in Islam. Theologically the ninety-nine beautiful names are important in Islam because they are revealed in 
the Qur’an. Thus they hold special prominence and importance in the tradition. 
47. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, ed. John Farina, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1987), 47–132. 
48. Al-Ghazālī. The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, 118-20. 
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that Muslims and Christians have a similar conception of love (at least in a loose way) as 
it relates to God. 
Though this neither constitutes a systematic account of love nor of the divine 
predicates in general, such examples do show how systematic theology can be used to 
determine whether Muslims and Christians elucidate a common set of generic predicates. 
While these inferences pertain specifically to the predicate of love, they illustrate how 
one might assess whether Muslims and Christians agree on other generic predicates (e.g., 
omnipotent, omnipresent). That is, systematic theology empowers us with ability to 
cross-reference generic predicates found in Islam with those in Christianity (and vice 
versa), where generic predicates can be compared and contrasted in a way that one can 
assess whether they share an adequate set of predicates held true about God. Systematic 
theology thus is a roadmap for deciding whether Muslims and Christians meet the second 
condition of reference. 
Though I cannot offer a comprehensive explication of the divine predicates, my 
intuition is that Muslims and Christians meet the second condition of reference because 
they maintain a set of generic predicates that, in their original sense, are loose. The fact is 
that Muslims and Christians uphold several generic predicates that have an equal if not 
greater semblance to one another than that of divine love. For instance, Muslims and 
Christians consistently maintain that God is good, creator, omnipotent, omnipresent (etc.) 
that, if investigated closer, are analogous to one another. From this perspective, Muslims 
and Christians appear to share and uphold a common list of generic predicates that track 
with Searle’s concept of descriptive looseness. Therefore my intuition is that Muslims 
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and Christians share and uphold an extensive list of generic predicates that sufficiently 
establishes the second condition of reference. 
If my intuition is correct and Muslims and Christians share the second condition 
of reference, then in light of the first condition (i.e., causal-historical account), they refer 
to the same God. Since Muslims and Christians use the same name-calling practice and 
qualify its use with a common set of generic predicates (e.g., omnipotent, omnipresent), it 
would be inconsistent to say they do not refer to the same God. This is demonstrated by 
how we use proper names in everyday use. Suppose, for instance, that someone asserts 
Robin Hood and then qualifies the use of the name with predicates such as “has a bow,” 
“robs the rich,” and “feeds the poor.” Likewise, suppose someone asserts George W. 
Bush and then qualifies the use of the name with predicates such as “former governor of 
Texas” and “the son of George H. W. Bush.” There is little chance, under these 
circumstances, that people integrated into either name-calling practice would remain 
confused as to which individual is being referenced. That is, it is difficult to imagine that 
people with access to a name-calling practice and the descriptive content elucidated 
during the name’s use will not be able to refer to the appropriate entity. 
 Thus I infer that Muslims and Christian refer to the same God because they share 
the same name-calling practice and elucidate a similar set of generic predicates. My 
argument is that whenever Muslims and Christians share generic predicates that are loose 
in their original sense, they refer to the same God given that they maintain the same 
name-calling practice. So when Muslims and Christians say things like, “God is good,” 
“God, you are powerful,” or “God, we need your love,” they refer to the same God. This 
line of argumentation, of course, follows from the fact that reference holds between 
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causal-historical account and descriptive content where the descriptive content remains 
loose in its original sense. Streamlined, my argument comprises the following string of 
propositions: 
 
(1) Muslims and Christians have been properly introduced into the same name-
calling practice that originated from the Abrahamic tradition (i.e., God) 
and 
(2) Muslims and Christians elucidate a list of generic predicates upon their 
independent uses of God 
thus 
(3) Muslims and Christians refer to the same God. 
 
This argument finds its foothold insofar as these propositions are maintained by Evans’ 
theory of reference and Searle’s theory of proper names. In other words, the claim is built 
on the juxtaposition between HTR and the categorial looseness of proper names. The 
argument therefore is that reference holds between a causal-historical exchange and 
descriptive content where the descriptive content must only remain loose. Therefore my 
argument is that Muslims and Christians refer to the same God from an Evanian-Searlian 
perspective. 
 An initial objection to my argument is that if generic predicates are not specific 
with regards to extent or quality, then there is no real ontological basis to ground an 
analysis on. That is, because generic predicates are nonspecific with regard to extent and 
quality, they risk falling into ontological obscurity that results in dubious metaphysical 
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commitments. Thus to argue that Muslims and Christians meet the second condition of 
reference is incoherent since generic predicates retain little ontological significance. 
 Though this is a thought-provoking objection, it fails to understand what Muslims 
and Christians agree on with respect to generic predicates. It is true that generic 
predicates are not specific with regards to extent or quality. However, this does not mean 
that generic predicates are inept in an ontological sense. Take, for instance, when 
Muslims and Christians use predicative phrases such as “God is love” or “God, you are 
good.” What Muslims and Christians agree on is that there is “something” within God’s 
character that is loving and good (i.e., analogical predication). That is, love and goodness 
expressed in the life of God and reality have an analogous relationship with one another. 
Otherwise, if predicates are inappropriate from a theological perspective, then Muslims 
and Christians enter dangerous theological terrain. If it is not more adequate to use 
predicates like goodness and love, then there is nothing keeping other predicates (e.g., 
evil, bad) from being used from the perspective of theology. Thus what Muslims and 
Christians agree on is that there are some predicates more appropriately used of God than 
others. 
 A different objection comes in the form of what constitutes descriptive 
dominance. As stated previously, descriptive content (in light of a causal-historical chain) 
establishes reference not by descriptive fit but by what is most dominant in the body of 
information associated with God. On the question at hand, some have argued that Trinity 
and Tawhid are, according to their own traditions, the most dominant descriptions in 
God’s dossier. If this happens to be true, then Muslims and Christians cannot corefer to 
the same God given that they are numerically and theologically oppositional. If accurate, 
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the consequence of this objection is that Muslims and Christians do not meet the second 
condition of reference; thus, my argument is incoherent. 
 This too is an interesting objection; however, it does not concern itself with the 
complexities associated with the referential use of proper names. Recall for a moment 
how proper names are used in a referential way. As previously outlined, proper names do 
not refer by descriptive exactitudes. For example, people integrated into name-calling 
practices do not have to accentuate a detailed and exhaustive list of predicates held true 
about entities to refer to them.49 Rather, as with Robin Hood, simply elucidating things 
such as “the man with the bow who robs the rich” or “the bandit who gives to the poor” is 
likely to meet the second condition of reference. 
If these inferences are correct as argued thus far, it seems the most dominant 
descriptive content connected with proper names is whatever is normally elucidated when 
a name is used. This I have argued is not precise with regards to extent or quality (i.e., 
generic predicates), given our everyday use of proper names. For example, individuals 
can refer to Robin Hood (or any other entity) without knowing every particular thing held 
true about him. If people had to accentuate particular things about Robin Hood (e.g., his 
height, the length of his bow) to refer to him, few individuals could do so simply from an 
epistemic perspective. In other words, it appears unlikely that people who casually refer 
to Robin Hood have access to what is irreducible and unique to his character. 
 
49. Though I am hesitate to uphold Searle’s conception of the referential use of proper names in 
all circumstances, I cannot think of any proper names that do not follow his conception. Even in the case 
where a proper name is found not to refer by generic predicates, I think there is enough evidence to say that 
God in the mouth of Muslims and Christians refers in a loose way.  
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Therefore what is most dominant in the example of Robin Hood (and most other 
proper names) is largely generic rather than specific predication. Though this does not 
mean that specific predicates (i.e., Trinity and Tawhid) are not valuable for establishing 
reference, it does mean that reference is a more complex process than this objection 
lends; therefore, such an objection remains largely unfounded. 
Argument 2: Different God in Worship 
 At this point I believe there is reasonable evidence to suggest that Muslims and 
Christians corefer to the same God. However, coreference does not necessarily entail 
common worship as worship relates to Muslims and Christians. I determine therefore that 
reference and worship are distinct functions. Primarily a question of philosophical 
theology, I seek to make this distinction in a rather ordinary manner. Rather than 
developing a sophisticated response for why reference and worship are distinct functions, 
I simply illustrate their dissimilarity with the following scenario: 
Suppose that a Muslim and a Christian walk into a liturgical rite (or service). 
Upon the opening segment, an entity represented by God is repeatedly invoked. Every 
time that God is invoked, the leader predicates something of God that the community at 
large holds true. As the segment progresses, predicates such as love, mercy, holy, lord, 
creator, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on are all at one time or another attributed of 
God.50 The first segment proceeds thus with the leader saying things such as, “God is 
love,” “God is the holy One,” and “God, you are the Creator.” These sorts of predicates 
continue until the end of the segment. However, as the second segment begins, the leader 
 
50. These are not the only predicates jointly maintained within the Islamic and Christian 
traditions. The fact is that there are several other predicates Muslims and Christians are likely to agree upon 
in a generic way.  
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adjusts the predicates she attributes to God. Rather than predicating attributes such as 
love and creator, the leader predicates that God is Triune. Throughout this segment, the 
leader says only things like “God is Trinity” or “God is a Triune being.” So the segment 
proceeds and ends with affirmation that God is Triune.  
Such a scenario fits nicely with the previous chapter and its distinction between 
generic and specific predicates. Broadly speaking, the leader moves from general to more 
particular claims about God as the liturgy proceeds. The leader begins with general 
claims like “God is love” and “God, you are the Creator.” These, of course, mimic 
generic predicates given that they do not clarify the extent or quality of God’s character 
as maintained by the community at large. As the liturgy proceeds, these generic 
predicates are changed to a more specific predicate (i.e., Trinity). The Triune language 
mimics specific predicates insofar as the community maintains the Trinity as indictive 
exclusively of God. There is thus a move in this scenario from generic predicates that are 
neither irreducible nor unique to specific predicates that are. 
 In light of this scenario as it relates to the previous chapter, there are two 
inferences that distinguish reference from worship. The first is that the Muslim and the 
Christian are likely, if not theologically compelled, to affirm the leader and the predicates 
attributed to God in the first segment. There is no reason either the Muslim or the 
Christian would object to statements such as “God is love,” “God is the holy One,” and 
“God, you are the Creator.” These predicates are maintained in the Islamic and Christian 
traditions as stated in the previous chapter. The second is that the Muslim in this 
particular scenario is unlikely to affirm the leader and her statements about God in the 
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latter segment.51 Unlike the Christian, the Muslim is unable to affirm that God is Triune 
primarily on theological grounds. Given that Tawhid is an irreducible and unique 
predicate for the Muslim, there is no way that the Muslim can affirm the Triune language 
without committing the most heinous of sins (i.e., shirk).52  
Though there are foreseeable limitations with this scenario, these inferences 
illustrate the fundamental difference between reference and worship. As argued thus far, 
reference appears to function by what is neither irreducible nor unique of a given entity. 
The function of reference largely entails abstract predicates held true about entities (e.g., 
Nikola Jokic is tall). As depicted in the scenario, the Muslim and the Christian meet the 
appropriate conditions to refer to God since they affirm the leader and the predicates in 
the former segment. 
Simple affirmation of the former segment, however, does not necessarily equate 
to worship. Worship entails, unlike reference, more particular and concrete predicates 
held true about entities. One such reason worship entails particular and concrete 
predicates is that worship illuminates the most important doctrines held true by a given 
community.53 Worship is what Graham Hughes calls a “thickly woven plenitude” where 
words, symbols, and movement create meaningful experiences that illuminate what a 
 
51. Notice that this inference would also apply if the scenario were reversed, where the leader 
predicates Tawhid in the second segment rather than the Trinity. Under such circumstances the Christian 
would be unable to affirm that God is Tawhid in light of theological grounds. 
52. Apart of Islamic religious vocabulary, shirk signifies the act of “associating” an entity with 
God. Often translated as “associationism,” it can be more explicitly translated as polytheism. Though shirk 
is never equated with Christians in the Qur’anic text, Christians have come to be regarded as committing 
shirk in terms of their conception of Trinity. For more on this point, see D. Gimaret, “Shirk,” The 
Encyclopedia of Islam: New Edition 9:484–6. 
53. Bryan D. Spinks, “Worship,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. John 
Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (New York: University of Oxford, 2007), 378–93. 
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community cares about.54 In relation to liturgical rites, the most important beliefs a 
community holds will be logically interwoven into its ceremonial rituals (e.g., the 
Eucharist, the call to prayer) and sense impressions (e.g., sight, smell). One can envision 
in the previous scenario the leader undertaking the Eucharist prayer or the Rite of 
Baptism during the latter segment. These rites incorporate “thick” theological words, 
symbols, and movements. It is unlikely the Muslim in these scenarios would agree with 
such beliefs because these rituals (and others like them) are saturated in Triune language. 
In this sense, worship entails specific predicates that are built on a “thickly woven 
plenitude” of ritualistic practice. 
The consequence must be that Muslims and Christians refer to but do not worship 
the same God. This is depicted in the previous scenario since it moves from open-ended 
to more specific claims about God. Once the leader incorporates Triune language, there is 
no theological basis for the Muslim to continue to agree with the leader. In this sense, it is 
unlikely from the standpoint of philosophy of language that Muslims and Christians 
would agree on anything beyond generic predication. Given that reference is largely 
determined in relation to generic predicates, Muslims and Christians meet the conditions 
for common reference in this scenario. Yet because worship incorporates a “thickly 
woven plenitude” of ritualistic practice, there is no basis for common worship. Therefore, 
the argument is that Muslims and Christians refer to the same God when generic 
predicates are used; however, they do not worship the same God, considering that 
worship entails specific predicates. 
 
54. Graham Hughes, Worship as Meaning: A Liturgical Theology for Late Modernity (New York: 
Cambridge, 2003), 30-42. 
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One objection to the distinction between reference and worship is that the words, 
symbols, and movements of liturgical rites often incorporate generic predicates along 
with specific predicates. Though specific predicates are primary in liturgical rites, generic 
predicates still remain prominent. In this sense, worship is not exclusively built on 
specific predicates since generic predicates remain an important element. The objection 
thus maintains that if worship comprises generic and specific predicates, then it makes 
little sense why generic predicates do not meet the appropriate threshold for worship. In 
other words, if Muslims and Christians agree upon a set of generic predicates, why does 
this not count as common worship?  
Though an interesting objection, this critique overlooks the distinction between 
generic and specific predication. As articulated in the previous chapter, communal 
identity is largely maintained because certain kinds of beliefs hold precedence over other 
beliefs. As such, primary beliefs are maintained at the expense of adapting or negating 
the less important beliefs. In light of the previous scenario, the assumption is that the 
Muslim and the Christian automatically adapt generic predication to fit their particular 
conceptions of specific predication. From this perspective, the Muslim and the Christian 
agree only in the former segment insofar as they maintain that God is loosely associated 
with generic predicates. So the objection is right insofar as generic predicates are 
essential in worship; however, it misses that specific predicates hold precedence over 
generic predicates. This leads to the conclusion that Muslims and Christians refer to but 
do not worship the same God. 
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have argued that Muslims and Christians refer to but do not 
worship the same God. This argument is built on two primary premises. The first premise 
is that, according to HTR, Muslims and Christians meet the two conditions that establish 
reference. I demonstrated this with two arguments. On the one hand, I determined that 
Muslims and Christians inherited the same original descriptive content from the 
Abrahamic tradition. On the other hand, I argued that, according to systematic theology, 
Muslims and Christians retain this original descriptive content in a generic way. It thus 
follows from these arguments that Muslims and Christians refer to the same God because 
the referential use of proper names operates by descriptive looseness (i.e., the Searlian 
concept). The second premise is that common reference between Muslims and Christians 
does not equate to worship. In a relatively straightforward argument, I claimed that 
worship entails particular and concrete descriptions (i.e., specific predicates) while 
reference entails loose description (i.e., generic predicates). Therefore, in this chapter I 
demonstrated that reference primarily entails generic predication that is common among 
Muslims and Christians, while worship entails specific predication, which cannot 
possibly be common among Muslims and Christians. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
Muslims and Christians Do Not Worship the Same God  
In this thesis, I have sought to answer whether Muslims and Christians worship 
the same God. To answer the question, I made two important distinctions in the second 
chapter. The first distinction is between reference and predication. Reference primarily 
holds between a linguistic or cognitive element and an entity that allows that particular 
entity to be tracked, picked out, or associated with information. Unlike reference, 
predication is a relation between two (or more) entities (e.g., objects, individuals, 
attributes, modes) that locates these entities in their respective ontological categories. 
Thus by applying philosophy of language, I established that reference and predication are 
distinct and independent functions that render different linguistic outcomes.  
As a subsidiary of the first, the second distinction is between generic and specific 
predication, where being in (or inhering in) is characteristic of generic predication while 
being said of is indicative of specific predication. In this sense, specific predicates 
illustrate the type, genus, attribute, or mode that is irreducible and unique of an entity 
while generic predicates express those that are more universal. The perspective here is 
that specific and generic predicates elucidate entities by different ontological means that 
logically configure reality in such a way that generates meaningful statements or 
concepts. 
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With these distinctions in mind, I argued in the third chapter that Muslims and 
Christians refer to the same God. This argument rested on two basic propositions. The 
first is that Muslims and Christians have been properly integrated into the same name-
calling practice that originates with the Abrahamic tradition. Though I neither proposed 
nor formally demonstrated this proposition, the scholarly support backing this claim is 
nearly univocal. The second proposition is that Muslims and Christians share a set of 
generic predicates that are dominant in the cluster of information associated with God. I 
demonstrated this with two forms of argumentation. On the one front, I argued that 
proper names in their everyday uses refer because they are connected to descriptive 
content that is neither detailed nor exhaustive. Proper names refer because they elucidate 
a sufficient and yet unspecific set of predicates held true about entities. On the other 
front, I claimed that systematic theology reveals that Muslims and Christians share an 
extensive list of generic predicates. When systematic accounts of Islamic and Christian 
theology are compared and contrasted, they reveal that Muslims and Christians conceive 
of God in a similar way in terms of generic predication. It follows from these arguments 
that Muslims and Christians refer to the same God since the two conditions of HTR are 
adequate for establishing reference. 
 Finally, though Muslims and Christians refer to the same God, I concluded that 
this does not equate to worship of the same God. Because worship entails particular and 
concrete predicates held true about God, it is theoretically impossible for Muslims and 
Christians to worship the same God. This is true in liturgical rites where specific 
predicates are thickly woven into ceremonial rites. Thus if reference does not equate to 
 
76 
 
worship and my points leading up this conclusion have been adequately argued, then 
Muslims and Christians refer to but do not worship the same God. 
Intolerance and Violence 
In light of my line of argumentation, I want to take up a prominent assumption 
made in several circles concerning the question at hand. It has been argued that focused 
attention on the philosophical and theological difference between Muslims and Christians 
provokes intolerance and violence. The assumption here is that if Muslims and Christian 
fail to admit that they worship the same God, then tension and hostility between them is 
an inevitable consequence. Volf, for example, promotes this line of argumentation. He 
says, “I . . . elevate pervasive similarities, because my primary concern is the ability of 
Muslims and Christians to live a peaceful, well-ordered life in this world.”1 In this sense, 
the only way for Muslims and Christians to live in peaceful harmony together is to 
maintain that they worship the same God. Otherwise, they are doomed for tension and 
hostility. 
I anticipate that some variation of this argument will at one time or another be 
used against my thesis. Though I do not think the argument is persuasive, I want to draw 
attention to two flawed assumptions that undergird the argument. First, since the 
methodology that underpins this argument is largely a reaction to past junctures of 
intolerance and violence between Muslims and Christians, it does not make an adequate 
distinction between truth claims and appropriating beliefs for different ends.2 Though 
contextual circumstances are important for indicating socio-political issues, they do not 
 
1. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 183. 
2. The Crusades (1096-1271), War in Abkhazia (1992-93) Yugoslav War (1991-2001), etc.  
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maintain normative value when judging whether something is true. Simply said, truth 
does not depend upon the particulars of context. Second, this claim is theoretically 
problematic at best and false at worst because the conclusion does not follow from the 
premise. The fact is that one can claim that Muslims and Christians do not worship the 
same God and still remain peaceful (e.g., the current thesis). As a sort of two-part 
critique, people can make truth claims that divide individuals along political, social, and 
religious lines and still remain peaceful; peace does not depend upon the blurring of truth 
claims so that all people stand equally before truth.  
Areas for Additional Research 
 In this thesis, I employed philosophy of language to clarify predication and with 
the intent to answer whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. However, 
there are still other avenues for developing a response to whether Muslims and Christians 
worship the same God. Not only are there other subdisciplines of philosophy embedded 
in the question (e.g., philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, epistemology), there are 
also alternate areas of research that should be considered (e.g., theology, history). Though 
I have targeted the question from the perspective of philosophy of language with 
particular interest in reference and predication, this neither embodies an all-encompassing 
synthesis of the research nor a conclusive response on the question itself. It is impossible 
to develop a normative response to the question at hand as long as other disciplines have 
not been considered. My line of argumentation and others like it are not normative in and 
of themselves on the question and require other loci. Therefore, there is growing need for 
a multidisciplined response on whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. 
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 An additional line of investigation is to explore what is entailed in worship. 
Though I have offered judgments on this point, neither my project nor much of the 
research on whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God outline the 
philosophical or theological elements embedded in worship. The only guiding 
assumption offered here and elsewhere is that reference necessarily precedes worship. 
However, this neither clarifies what is entailed in worship nor how that should influence 
one’s decision on the question. Because so little emphasis has been placed on worship as 
it relates to the current question, my assumption is that further analysis of worship would 
enhance this area of research.  
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